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I. INTRODUCTION
Although sometimes described as war, the fight against transnational jihadi groups (referred to for shorthand as the “fight against terrorism”)
largely takes place away from any recognizable battlefield. Terrorism suspects are captured in houses, on street corners, and at border crossings
around the globe. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the high-level Qaeda operative who planned the September 11 attacks, was captured by the Pakistani
government in a residence in Pakistan.1 Abu Omar, a radical Muslim imam,
was apparently abducted by U.S. and Italian agents off the streets of Milan.2
And Abu Baker Bashir, the spiritual leader of the Qaeda-affiliated group
responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings, was arrested in a hospital in Indonesia.3 Once captured, these suspects face a host of possible futures: they
might be deported to their states of nationality; they might be criminally
prosecuted for offenses under national law; they might be transferred to a
foreign state for detention and interrogation; or they might be detained for
extended periods in national detention facilities, like the U.S. facility at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
From an international legal perspective, the critical question with
respect to terrorism suspects who are not captured on a recognizable battlefield (referred to here as “non-battlefield detainees”) is whether they have
any rights not available to detainees picked up in a theater of combat. Much
of the legal discussion on terrorism detainees has uncritically lumped nonbattlefield detainees together with those captured on a recognizable battlefield, but the context of the capture is significant. International law historically differentiates between detentions that occur in states at peace and
those that occur during war. In peacetime, international human rights law
imposes procedural and substantive constraints on a state’s authority to detain. For instance, any detention must be grounded in law, must not be arbitrary, and must be subject to judicial review.4 In wartime, the law of armed
conflict generally applies as the lex specialis and permits states to detain
persons reasonably suspected of threatening state security, without affording
1
See Erik Eckholm & David Johnston, Qaeda Suspect Sound Asleep at Trail’s End, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2003, at A1.
2
See Richard Owen, CIA Agents Must Be Charged Over “Kidnap and Torture,” Says
Judge, TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 17, 2007, at 39.
3
See Dinda Jouhana & Richard C. Paddock, Top Indonesian Suspect Leaves Jail, L.A.
TIMES, June 14, 2006, at A21, available at 2006 WLNR 10159088; Richard Paddock, Indonesia Arrests Cleric in Bombings, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, at A3.
4
See infra Section II.C.
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them judicial guarantees.5 That expansive authority to detain reflects the
understanding that, during war, the balance between security and liberty
shifts. The state’s security interests become paramount, so the liberty costs
of detaining and thereby incapacitating the enemy are tolerated.
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, two dominant strands of
thought have emerged on the international law that governs non-battlefield
detentions. One strand asserts that states are at war with al Qaeda and other
transnational jihadi groups, and that the law of armed conflict thus applies
to permit the detention of terrorism suspects captured anywhere in the world
for as long as necessary or until “hostilities” cease.6 The poster child for this
position is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who the U.S. government first detained at a secret prison operated by the CIA, and then at Guantánamo Bay.7
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed views himself as a soldier fighting a war against
the United States and its allies.8 And by U.S. government accounts, his detention and the detention of other high-level terrorist operatives have been
invaluable to preventing terrorist attacks and saving innocent lives.9 Like
5

See infra Section II.B.
See, e.g., Thomas Hemingway, Wartime Detention of Enemy Combatants: What If
There Were a War and No One Could Be Detained Without an Attorney?, 34 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 63 (2006) (applying the law of armed conflict to the detention of terrorism suspects and not distinguishing between suspects captured on or off the battlefield); John B.
Bellinger, III, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Dep’t of State, Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism, Speech at the London School of Economics 7-8 (Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Bellinger
Speech], available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesandEvents/pdf/
20061031_JohnBellinger.pdf (“Al Qaida’s operations against the United States and its allies
continue not only in and around Afghanistan but also in other parts of the world. And because we remain in a continued state of armed conflict with al Qaida, we are legally justified
in continuing to detain al Qaida members captured in this conflict.”); Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of State, Remarks of Secretary Condoleezza Rice upon Her Departure for Europe
(Dec. 5, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57602.htm; John B.
Bellinger, III, Armed Conflict with Al Qaida?, OPINIOJURIS, Jan. 15, 2007, http://www.opini
ojuris.org/posts/1168811565.shtml. The U.S. government’s position on obtaining custody
over detainees appears to have evolved. The U.S. government no longer asserts that it has the
authority to use its coercive powers to capture suspects all over the world without the consent
of the territorial state. See Bellinger Speech, supra, at 10-11. Nevertheless, the U.S. government continues to assert the authority to detain, based on the law of armed conflict, nonbattlefield suspects who find themselves in U.S. hands.
7
See Eckholm & Johnston, supra note 1; Mark Mazzetti, Pentagon Revises Its Rules on
Prosecution of Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A18.
8
See Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024,
at 21, Mar. 10, 2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10024.pdf
(transcript of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s hearing at Guantánamo Bay); see also Mark Mazzetti & Margot Williams, In Tribunal Statement, Confessed Plotter of Sept. 11 Burnishes
Image as a Soldier, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2007, at A15.
9
See George W. Bush, President of the U.S., President Discusses Creation of Military
Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006) [hereinafter President's Speech
on Military Commissions], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09
6
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armed-conflict detentions, then, counterterrorism detentions are not necessarily intended to punish for prior wrongdoing,10 but to prevent terrorist
operatives from planning or engaging in further attacks and, if possible, to
obtain from them information for use in future military, intelligence, or law
enforcement operations. Advocates of the armed-conflict approach assert
that these goals cannot always be achieved through the criminal process.11
The second, competing strand of thought rejects the application of
the law of armed conflict and asserts that international human rights law
applies to prohibit the detention of non-battlefield suspects except through
the criminal process.12 Advocates of this position point to the inadequacy of
the controls under the law of armed conflict, to the very real possibility that
detainees will be held for life without legal process, and to the known incidents of mistake. Individuals wrongfully suspected of terrorism have been
captured in the course of their everyday lives and then detained for extended
periods without any judicial oversight, and often without communication
with the outside world. In one case, a German national (named Khaled elMasri) was arrested by Macedonian officials, transferred to the CIA for
detention and interrogation, and then released five months later in rural Albania after U.S. officials determined that he had been mistakenly identified
as a terrorism suspect.13 This and similar cases demonstrate the problem

/20060906-3.html (describing the CIA detention program as “one of the most vital tools in
our war against the terrorists”).
10
International and U.S. law both recognize that detention on the grounds of danger to the
community is not always punitive. For the international law, see Subsection II.C.2. For a
distillation of U.S. law, see U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987).
11
See, e.g., GEORGE TENET, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE CIA 255
(2007) (“I believe that none of these successes would have happened if we had to treat KSM
[Khalid Shaikh Mohammed] like a white-collar criminal—read him his Miranda rights and
get him a lawyer who surely would have insisted that his client shut up.”).
12
See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality and the Rule of Law, 25 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 303-04 (2002) (asserting that the United States has pursued “a
highly problematic armed conflict alternative to the criminal law paradigm, which is readily
available to combat terrorist acts and threats”); Avril McDonald, Terrorism, CounterTerrorism, and the Jus in Bello, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND
RESPONSES 57, 62 (Michael N. Schmitt & Gian Luca Beruto eds., 2002) (“Al Qaeda and
other terrorist organizations must be defeated for the most part by detection (good intelligence) and by prosecution . . . under domestic criminal legislation.”); David Weissbrodt &
Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS J.
123, 136 (2006) (arguing that the detention of non-battlefield terrorism suspects not formally
convicted of a crime violates human rights law); Michael Ratner, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2007, at A12 (“No domestic or international law permits preventative detention [in the fight against terrorism].”).
13
See Council of Eur., Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member
States, at 25-29, EUR. PARL. DOC. 10957 (June 12, 2006) (prepared by Dick Marty) [herei-
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with applying the law of armed conflict without sufficient checks and in the
absence of any geographic or temporal constraints: it comes to displace human rights law, such that anyone who is merely suspected of terrorism may
be picked up anywhere in the world and detained indefinitely, without judicial guarantees.14 The criminal process, by contrast, is a fair and transparent
mechanism for determining that those who are suspected of terrorism are in
fact dangerous, based on their prior conduct.
This debate is important, but it has become both sterile and divorced from reality. In fact, neither strand of thought tracks international
law and practice. International human rights law recognizes that, even in
peacetime, those who threaten state security may be detained outside the
criminal process and instead through calibrated systems of administrative
detention. The option of administrative detention, however, has been neglected in the international legal debate on non-battlefield detentions.15 This
has been to our detriment. International practice demonstrates that states—
and particularly western democracies that take seriously their human rights
obligations, but also face a real threat from transnational jihadi terrorism—
perceive an occasional but serious need to detain non-battlefield terrorism
suspects outside the criminal process. In the absence of a clear legal framework for satisfying that need, these states have resorted to a variety of ad
hoc or uncontrolled measures. Thus, although all western democracies continue to rely heavily on the criminal process to prosecute and detain nonbattlefield suspects,16 many have also acted outside that process. The bipolar
nafter COE Report]; Neil A. Lewis, Man Mistakenly Abducted by CIA Seeks Reinstatement
of Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2006, at A15.
14
Cf. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004) (describing the
blurring of boundaries between war and peace in the fight against terrorism); Steven Ratner,
Are the Geneva Conventions Out of Date?, 48 L. QUADRANGLE NOTES 66, 70 (2005) (“The
conflict with Al Qaeda needs to have boundaries beyond which the . . . law of war . . . do[es]
not apply.”).
15
Although neglected in the international legal debate, U.S. lawyers have begun advocating for the United States to detain terrorism suspects administratively. See, e.g., Benjamin
Wittes, Terrorism, the Military, and the Courts, 143 POL'Y REV. 21 (2007); Jack Goldsmith
& Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19; Michael
Mukasey, Editorial, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at A15;
Stuart Taylor, Terrorism Suspects and the Law, NAT'L J., May 12, 2007, at 17; George J.
Terwilliger, III, “Domestic Unlawful Combatants”: A Proposal to Adjudicate Constitutional
Detentions, ENGAGE, Oct. 2006, at 55.
16
For a sample of cases in which the United States has criminally prosecuted nonbattlefield suspects, see United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408, 413-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2007),
concerning a conspiracy to bomb a New York City subway station; United States v. Ali, 396
F. Supp. 2d 703 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), concerning membership in al Qaeda and participation in a
plan to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States); and Ralph Blumenthal, American Said
to Have Ties to Al Qaeda Is Denied Bail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at A20, reporting that at
least fifteen Americans have been charged with aiding al Qaeda. For examples in other west-
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paradigm for thinking about non-battlefield detentions—as armed-conflict
or criminal—fails to reflect international law and is increasingly out of step
with international practice.
This Article takes that international practice seriously in order to
move the conversation beyond the stale armed-conflict or criminal divide.
Part II reviews the current debate and argues that international law actually
presents us with three—not two—broad models for detention in the fight
against terrorism: the armed-conflict model and, under human rights law,
the criminal and administrative models. Part II demonstrates that international law is ambiguous as to which of these three models properly governs
non-battlefield detentions, but that both the armed-conflict model and exclusive reliance on the criminal model carry significant costs. Administrative detention thus is a potentially appealing alternative for incapacitating
non-battlefield suspects before they strike.
Part III, however, argues that the legal parameters of administrative
detention are poorly developed or unworkable in the security context. This
renders administrative detention insufficiently constrained and easily subject to abuse. Indeed, several states have resorted to administrative detention
in the fight against terrorism and have failed to administer adequate controls. States have also engaged in other, even less palatable measures. The
United States consistently has asserted the authority to detain non-battlefield
suspects based on the law of armed conflict, and even though most other
states publicly reject that practice, several have discreetly participated in
it.17 Several have also sought to deport terrorism suspects, despite the risk
of mistreatment in their home countries, in order to reduce the more proximate threat these suspects pose in the deporting states’ own territories.18
Part IV reviews that practice to demonstrate that states perceive a real need
to contain the threat from non-battlefield suspects without resort to the criminal process, and that they have employed a range of ad hoc or uncontrolled
measures to satisfy that need.
In light of that practice, Part V argues that international law should
continue to allow states to detain non-battlefield suspects outside the criminal process, but that it must better regulate such detention to protect against
abuse. The oft-overlooked administrative model is best suited to accomplish
ern democracies, see Colin Warbrick, The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of
Human Rights, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 989 (2004) (Europe); Alan Cowell, British Antiterrorism
Chief Warns of More Severe Qaeda Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, at A5 (United Kingdom); Renwick McLean, Trial Opens in Madrid for 24 Accused of Aiding Qaeda Cell, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005, at A10 (Spain); Elaine Sciolino & Helene Fouquet, Belgium Is Trying
to Unravel the Threads of a Terror Web, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at A1 (Belgium); and
Craig S. Smith, 6 Former Guantánamo Detainees on Trial in Paris, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2006, at A8 (France).
17
See infra Sections III.A, III.B.
18
See infra Section III.B.
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these goals, if the law on administrative detention is developed to better
balance the liberty and security interests as they arise in the fight against
terrorism. Toward that end, Part V outlines four policy goals to inform the
development of law in this area. First, detainees must be afforded prompt
and meaningful legal process. Second, extended administrative detention
should be permitted only in narrowly defined circumstances: where the detainee himself poses a serious security threat, where detention is necessary
to contain that threat, and where detention lasts no longer than necessary.
Third, in those circumstances, security-based administrative detention
should be permitted even if not tied to other legal proceedings, such as future criminal charges or deportation. And finally, any state that employs a
system of administrative detention must define the boundaries between it
and the criminal process. With these constraints in place, administrative
detention may prove an effective way to navigate between the at times opposing shoals of liberty and security that make the legal response to nonbattlefield detention at once so vexing and so vital.
Before proceeding with that argument, three clarifying points are in
order. First, it is important to establish at the outset the parameters of each
of the three models for detention examined in this Article. The armedconflict model broadly permits detention, without judicial guarantees, until
the circumstances justifying it cease to exist. As this Article explains in Section II.B, the law of armed conflict is, in fact, more nuanced. It recognizes
different detention regimes, depending on whether the conflict is international or non-international, and if the former, whether the detainee is a combatant or a civilian. Nevertheless, the broad strokes of the armed-conflict
model (as just described) are constant across the various detention regimes.19 The criminal model, by contrast, is more restrictive. It permits detention in essentially two circumstances: (1) where the person has been
charged with a criminal offense and is awaiting a criminal adjudication; and
(2) where the person is being punished after a criminal conviction. This
Article acknowledges that other forms of detention may also be used to advance the interests of the criminal process—for instance, to prevent flight
before filing criminal charges, or to preserve a material witness for use during a criminal trial.20 Yet it does not understand those forms of detention to
be “through” the criminal process or under the criminal model. To the contrary, such detention is understood to be administrative. Generally speaking,
19

Note that detentions based on the armed-conflict model may nevertheless be inconsistent with particular aspects of the law of armed conflict. The purpose of this Article is not to
condemn such inconsistencies, but rather to examine the antecedent question of whether the
armed-conflict model is even a suitable one for non-battlefield detentions.
20
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000) (U.S. material witness statute); United States v.
Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003) (interpreting the material witness statute to permit the
detention of witnesses for criminal proceedings relating to the September 11 attacks).
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the administrative model encompasses detentions designed to satisfy strong
public interests other than punishment or condemnation for proscribed, prior
conduct.
Second, this Article addresses the legal standards that govern detention itself, and not the conditions of confinement or the treatment of detainees. Those latter issues have been addressed comprehensively in the legal
literature,21 and this Article assumes that, under all models of detention,
controls may be established (consistent with the applicable legal prescriptions) to protect detainees against mistreatment.
Finally, this Article focuses on the detention options available to
states that are targeted by transnational jihadi groups like al Qaeda.22 That
focus is appropriate because, as explained in Part II, the fight against such
groups has attributes of an armed conflict that justify the use of detention
options outside the criminal process, but also attributes that make it unlike
other armed conflicts, and that render inadequate the detention options under the law of armed conflict. Despite the particular focus on transnational
jihadi groups, however, this Article has obvious implications for states seeking to detain members of other kinds of terrorist or insurgent groups.
Whether security-based administrative detention is justifiable in those other
contexts ultimately depends on the nature of the fight and the security threat
posed. In order for such detention to be viable, however, its parameters must
be refined.
II. A TRIPOLAR PARADIGM
International lawyers have vigorously debated which legal regime—the law of armed conflict or human rights law—governs measures
taken in the fight against terrorism. The focal point of debate has been
whether terrorist acts and the varied counterterrorism measures taken in
response may properly be characterized as an “armed conflict” so as to trigger the application of the law of armed conflict. If we are engaged in a
global armed conflict against transnational jihadi groups, then (the reasoning goes) the law of armed conflict governs all or most measures that target

21

See, e.g., David E. Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and
Detainees, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 61 (2005); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations
to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43
COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811 (2005); Jack Balkin, The Anti-Torture Memos, BALKINIZATION,
Dec. 22, 2006, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/12/anti-torture-memos.html (compilation of
posts on civil liberties in the so-called “War on Terror”).
22
For a coded map of countries recently attacked by such groups, see World Under Fire,
Radical Islamic Incidents Across the World, http://www.worldunderfire.com (last visited
March 31, 2008).
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such groups, including the detention of non-battlefield terrorism suspects.23
By contrast, if we are not engaged in a global armed conflict, then the law
of armed conflict applies only in those regions where hostilities remain ongoing, and human rights law applies without specification everywhere else
(i.e., to all detentions taken outside a theater of combat).24 The predominant
assumption is that, where human rights law applies, it permits detention
only through the criminal process.25
This Part of the Article argues that international law is indeterminate on the question of whether the fight against terrorism constitutes an
armed conflict, and that the focus on that question has obscured more fundamental questions concerning the suitability of the existing legal regimes
to govern particular counterterrorism measures.26 In the context of non-

23
For general arguments that the law of armed conflict governs, see, for example, OREN
GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 389-93 (2006); and Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions
to the “Global War on Terrorism,” 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 165, 169 (2005), concluding that the
law of armed conflict governs “some aspects of the GWOT.” For arguments that the law of
armed conflict governs the detention of non-battlefield terrorism suspects, see sources cited
supra note 6.
24
For general arguments that the law of armed conflict does not govern, see, for example,
Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Legal Case Against the Global War on Terror, 36 CASE. W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 349, 350 (2004); and Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 n.16 (2001).
25
See sources cited supra note 12. For evidence that this bipolar paradigm exists, see, for
example, Sean O. Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the “War on Terrorism”: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed “Unprivileged Combatants,” 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1151, which states that “if al Qaeda suspects picked up
in places other than the battlefield . . . are not regarded as combatants under the laws of war,
then they . . . could be arrested and tried in regular courts for transnational crime, or they
could be closely monitored by law enforcement authorities”; and Int’l Comm. of the Red
Cross, US Detention Related to the Events of 11 September 2001 and Its Aftermath—the
Role of the ICRC, (Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/85C
5BCF85E7A57A4C12570D5002E6889, stating that, “There are currently two broad strands
of legal thinking: according to one, detainees in the ‘global war on terror’ are all criminal
suspects and should be treated as such. According to the other, they are all prisoners of war
and should be treated as such.”
26
Some scholars have argued that the existing legal regimes are insufficient in the fight
against terrorism and that the international community must therefore develop new rules to
govern that fight. See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, Protecting Rights in the Age of Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 669, 677-78 (2005); Glenn M. Sulmasy, The
Law of Armed Conflict in the Global War on Terror: International Lawyers Fighting the
Last War, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 309, 314 (2005). But see Gabor Rona,
Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 499, 499 (2005) (“[W]e should be skeptical of the view that the complementary
frameworks of criminal law, human rights law, the web of multilateral and bilateral arrangements for interstate cooperation in police work and judicial assistance, and the law of armed
conflict fail to provide tools necessary to combat terrorism.”). These scholars, however, have
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battlefield detentions, international law offers three—not two—broad models for detention: the armed-conflict model, and under human rights law, the
criminal and administrative models. Neither the armed-conflict model nor
the criminal model is particularly well-suited for such detentions, so administrative detention is a potentially appealing alternative. Its appeal, however,
depends largely on how it is implemented—a question to which this Article
turns in Part III.
A.

Armed Conflict?

International law provides no clear guidance on when, in the absence of sustained interstate hostilities, an “armed conflict” exists so as to
trigger the application of the law of armed conflict.27 Under international
law, the existence of an armed conflict turns on a qualitative assessment of:
(1) the participants’ own understandings and intentions; (2) their level of
organization; and (3) the intensity and duration of the violence.28 This test is
indeterminate in the fight against terrorism.
That fight certainly has some attributes of an armed conflict. Participants have been engaged in “hot” zones of combat for over six years, and at
least two participants—al Qaeda and the United States—understand themselves to be at war with each other.29 In addition, terrorist attacks have the
not addressed the particular context of non-battlefield detentions and have not attempted to
specify the rules that should govern in this area.
27
See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT, 31-34 (2002).
28
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Oct. 2, 1995) (asserting that an “armed conflict
exists whenever there is . . . protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups”); MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF,
NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 628 n.9 (1982) (quoting ICRC understandings that armed conflicts do not include riots “not directed by a leader and hav[ing] no
concerted intent,” but do include “military operations carried out by armed forces or organized armed groups”); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL STRIFE: THEIR
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 76 (1987) (explaining that armed conflicts are distinguished
from mere internal tensions and disturbances based on the level of organization of the actors,
their intent, and the duration and intensity of the conflict).
29
See, e.g., Bin Laden Still Alive, Aide Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2005, at A20 (reporting
on an al Qaeda statement that it is still engaged in a war against the West); Selig S. Harrison,
A New Hub for Terrorism? In Bangladesh, an Islamic Movement with Al-Qaeda Ties Is on
the Rise, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2006, at A15 (referring to Osama Bin Laden’s first declaration
of war against the United States, made on February 23, 1998); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Def., DOD Responds to ABA Enemy Combatant Report (Oct. 2, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/ Release.aspx?ReleaseID=3492 (asserting that “the
United States is currently in a state of war with al Qaeda”); cf. STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND
THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 388 (2005) (quoting a high-level British official
as asserting that Britain is “at war with terrorism”).
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potential for extraordinary violence, especially if they involve the use of
chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons.30 These attacks thus may challenge national sovereignty and inflict human casualties in ways that are paradigmatic of wartime battles.31
Yet the fight against terrorism also has attributes that indicate that it
is not an armed conflict. For instance, although terrorist attacks have the
potential for extreme violence, the violence to date has been somewhat episodic. In the ten-year period since al Qaeda first declared war, it and its affiliates have committed only a handful of attacks against the United States
outside recognizable theaters of combat. The attacks against U.S. allies have
been similarly intermittent. Moreover, even though these groups have some
organizational structure—in that their leaderships are identifiable and provide operational, financial, or ideological support for adherents—their levels of organization do not compare to that of a state’s armed forces or an
armed insurgency. Group “members” are geographically dispersed; they act
in independent and compartmentalized units, rather than as a coordinated
whole; their immediate agendas vary; and many have only loose (or no)
connections to an organizational base.32 The “parties” to the conflict thus
cannot be identified except in broad and abstract terms.33
Unfortunately, this indeterminacy on whether the global fight
against terrorism constitutes an armed conflict cannot be resolved by reference to the current law of armed conflict. The 1949 Geneva Conventions
and their Additional Protocols identify essentially two categories of armed
30

Cf. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE & NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND 6
(2007) (“We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it
develops what it deems is sufficient capability.”).
31
See Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L. J. 1029, 1037
(2004).
32
See, e.g., Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Jihadist Threat: Hearing Before the
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcomm. of the H. Armed Servs.
Comm., 109th Cong. 3 (2006) (statement of Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Chair in Counterterrorism
and Counterinsurgency, RAND) (describing al Qaeda as having a core leadership but as
being a “loosely organized and connected movement that mixes and matches organizational
and operational styles”); Wyn Rees, European and Asian Responses to the US-Led “War on
Terror,” 20 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFF. 215, 216 (2007) (describing the loosely networked
nature of jihadi terrorist groups); Roula Khalaf & Stephen Fidler, From Frontline Attack to
Terror by Franchise, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), July 5, 2007, at 8 (“[A]n al-Qaeda core . . . provid[es] logistic support and training to some; and offer[s] nothing more than inspiration to
others.”).
33
See Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges
from the “War on Terror,” 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 60 (2003) (“The concept of a
‘party’ suggests a minimum level of organization required to enable the entity to carry out
the obligations of law. There can be no assessment of rights and responsibilities under humanitarian law in a war without identifiable parties.”).
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conflict.34 The first category—international armed conflicts—includes conflicts between states, and under Additional Protocol I, conflicts “in which
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination . . .
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” 35 The fight against
terrorism is neither. It is not predominantly between states and is not a fight
for self-determination within the terms of Additional Protocol I.36
The second category—conflicts “not of an international character”—is undefined and arguably could be interpreted to cover the fight
against terrorism.37 But doing so requires a significant conceptual leap (characterizing as “non-international” a conflict that is fought across the globe)
and results in the application of a legal regime that was developed with an
entirely different kind of conflict in mind.38 The regime applicable to non34

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 603
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] [Geneva
Conventions I-IV hereinafter referred to collectively as Geneva Conventions].
35
Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 1, ¶ 4; see also Geneva Conventions, supra
note 34, art. 2.
36
See Murphy, supra note 25, at 1118. Even if the fight against terrorism could be characterized as a fight for self-determination under Additional Protocol I, al Qaeda and its affiliates have not made the requisite unilateral declaration seeking status and assuming rights and
obligations under Article 96 of that Protocol. Id. It thus would not apply by its terms.
37
Geneva Conventions, supra note 34, art. 3. For arguments that the fight against terrorism is a non-international armed conflict, see, for example, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.
2749, 2795 (2006); Anthony Dworkin, Military Necessity and Due Process: The Place of
Human Rights in the War on Terror, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF
WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 53 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005);
and Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2003).
38
The regime applicable in non-international armed conflicts is set forth in Article 3
(common to all four Geneva Conventions) and expanded on in Additional Protocol II. Geneva Conventions, supra note 34, art. 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note 34. Although the
drafters of Common Article 3 had an internal armed conflict in mind, the text of that Article
permits an interpretation that applies to conflicts between states, on the one hand, and armed
sub-state actors not falling within the terms of Additional Protocol I, on the other hand. This
appears to be the approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at
2795.
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international armed conflicts was developed to temper the extraordinary
brutality of intrastate conflicts, which, at the time, were not amenable to
extensive international regulation. 39 These conflicts were relentlessly violent and geographically concentrated, not episodically violent and geographically diffuse like the fight against terrorism.
In short, the armed-conflict classification is an inadequate trigger
for identifying whether the law of armed conflict does or should apply in the
fight against terrorism. That fight has only some of the attributes of an
armed conflict. And even if it might reasonably be classified as a noninternational armed conflict, that classification does not by itself justify the
application of a legal regime designed to govern completely different kinds
of conflicts. That classification also fails to resolve the question of what the
law requires. As this Article explains in the next Section, there is some ambiguity on whether, and if so how, the law of armed conflict and human
rights law apply concurrently during non-international armed conflicts.40
The better approach, therefore, is not to ask whether the fight against terrorism constitutes an armed conflict and then to mechanically apply or reject
the law of armed conflict based on that classification, but to ask whether,
among the available legal regimes, the law of armed conflict best balances
the international community’s interests in the context of particular counterterrorism measures. In the context of non-battlefield detentions, the balance
is between preventing terrorist attacks on the one hand, and respecting the
liberty interests of potential detainees on the other hand.
B.

Detention Under the Law of Armed Conflict

There are obvious reasons why states would want to invoke the law
of armed conflict to detain terrorism suspects. That law grants states expansive detention authority on the understanding that the associated liberty
costs must be tolerated during wartime in the interests of state security. Detention in this context is not about punishment; it is about incapacitating

39
See, e.g., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 27-34 (Jean S. Pictet
ed., 1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION] (describing the history of
Common Article 3); id. at 36 (asserting that Common Article 3 conflicts “take place within
the confines of a single country”); see also INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY
ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949, at 1319 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS] (“[A] non-international armed conflict is distinct from an international armed conflict because . . . the parties to the conflict are not sovereign states, but the
government of a single state in conflict with one or more armed factions within its territory.”).
40
See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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persons and thereby containing the security threat they pose.41 This is conceptually consistent with the goals of detention in the fight against terrorism. States looking to detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects are primarily
interested, not in punishing them (although states may believe that punishment is desirable), but in preventing them from committing future attacks,
and if possible, obtaining from them actionable intelligence. Yet detaining
such suspects under the law of armed conflict imposes substantially higher
liberty costs than would be tolerated in a more conventional armed conflict.
The fight against terrorism is not, technically, an international
armed conflict.42 If it nevertheless is treated as one for purposes of applying
a detention regime, the law would permit states to detain anyone reasonably
suspected of posing a security threat until the circumstances justifying detention cease to exist, or until the end of hostilities.43 This regime was designed for conflicts between states that would end after several years and in
which combatants could be clearly identified.44 The fight against terrorism is
not so geographically or temporally contained. It takes place across the
globe and likely will continue for decades without any clear indicia of victory or defeat. Applying the law of armed conflict in this context would mean
that states could detain, potentially for life, persons captured anywhere in
the world based only on the reasonable suspicion that they pose some sort of
security threat.45
Moreover, such detention need not be accompanied by meaningful
legal process, in that detainees need not be afforded the opportunity to contest before a judicial body the circumstances giving rise to detention.46 In
41

In the parlance of the Geneva Conventions, the term “detention” has penal connotations.
The Conventions use the term “internment” to refer to non-penal deprivations of liberty. See,
e.g., Horst Fischer, Protection of Prisoners of War, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 321, 326 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
42
See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
43
See Geneva Convention III, supra note 34, arts. 21, 118 (permitting detention of combatants in an international armed conflict until the cessation of hostilities); Geneva Convention
IV, supra note 34, art. 42 (same for protected civilians so long as “absolutely necessary”);
COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 39, at 257 (explaining that states have
broad discretion to define the scope of activity that renders civilian detentions necessary).
44
See Geneva Conventions, supra note 34, art. 2; Geneva Convention III, supra note 34,
art. 4; W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION 41 (1992).
45
Even under the most protective regime for armed-conflict detentions—the regime governing the detention of protected civilians in enemy territory—a state has broad discretion
to detain where it has “good reason to think” the suspect poses a real security threat (for
instance, that he is engaged in sabotage or is a member of an organization whose object is to
cause disturbances). See COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 39, at 258.
46
See Geneva Convention III, supra note 34, arts. 21, 118 (presuming that combatants
may be detained without legal process until the end of hostilities); Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 34, art. 43 (permitting the detention of civilians with minimal legal process); INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
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conventional wars, the availability of such process is less critical because
the risk of detaining innocents is less pronounced. The Geneva Conventions
contemplate that the majority of detainees will be combatants who identify
themselves as such and who therefore have no basis for contesting their
detention. Terrorists, by contrast, operate by blending into the general population. This creates a substantial risk that any counterterrorism detention
regime will capture a disproportionately high number of innocents. Unlike
in international armed conflicts, then, there is a heightened need in the fight
against terrorism for some mechanism to ensure that detention in each case
is objectively necessary, or that the detainees are in fact dangerous.
If the fight against terrorism is instead treated as a non-international
armed conflict, then the rules governing detention are more ambiguous. The
law of armed conflict does not itself establish a scheme for detention in such
conflicts. The applicable provisions of the Geneva Conventions—set forth
at Common Article 3—assume that a state has broad discretion to detain,47
but (unlike the provisions governing detention in international armed conflicts) they do not purport to occupy the field in this area. The rules for detention historically have been found in the state’s domestic law, 48 as marginally constrained by the baseline protections of customary international law.
The customary law of armed conflict recognizes that states have broad discretion to detain persons until “the circumstances justifying . . . detention . .
. have ceased to exist.”49 This rule is akin to the one applicable in international armed conflicts, and the problems with applying it to the fight against
terrorism are the same: extended detention is permitted based only on the
reasonable suspicion of a threat and without any judicial guarantees.
Yet the dominant modern position is that the authority to detain during non-international armed conflicts is further constrained by the concurrent application of human rights law.50 If one accepts that position, and the
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 546-47 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter
COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION]; COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra
note 39, at 260-61 (describing that process as an independent but rudimentary second-stage
review of whether detention is necessary for state security).
47
Geneva Conventions, supra note 34, art. 3.
48
See COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 39-40 (explaining that
Common Article 3 requires that persons be treated humanely but does not restrict the measures that a state may take to contain a security threat).
49
Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 75. For evidence that Common Article 3 and
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I reflect customary international law applicable in all
armed conflicts, see 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 299-383 (2005); and Michael J. Matheson, Continuity
and Change in the Law of War: 1975 to 2005: Detainees and POWs, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 543, 547 (2006).
50
Additional Protocol II, drafted in the 1970s to enhance the minimalist provisions of
Common Article 3, clearly contemplates the continued application of human rights law during non-international armed conflicts. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 34, pmbl. (“Re-
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state has not derogated from its human rights obligations on detention,51
then the law permits both administrative detention and detention through the
criminal process. This technically is detention under human rights law (not
under the law of armed conflict) and is examined in Section II.C below. The
point here is that, in non-international armed conflicts governed by human
rights law, states have the discretion to detain persons who pose a security
threat either through a system of administrative detention or through the
criminal process.52 States have that discretion, even though detainees in
calling furthermore that international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the human person . . . .”); BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 28, at 636
(“[P]rovisions of the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] which have not
been reproduced in the Protocol or which provide for a higher standard of protection than the
Protocol should be regarded as applicable . . . .”). For other evidence that human rights law
continues to apply during non-international armed conflicts, see, for example, BOTHE,
PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 28, at 619, stating that “it cannot be denied that the general
rules contained in international instruments relating to human rights apply to noninternational conflicts”; and COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at
1340, which notes that “Human rights continue to apply concurrently in time of armed conflict.” See also Karima Bennoune, Toward a Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict:
Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 171, 226-27 (2004); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 266-73 (2000). Note that many
international lawyers also understand human rights law to apply during international armed
conflicts. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 225, ¶ 25 (July 8). Yet the application of human rights law during an international
armed conflict would not alter the governing detention regimes because the elaborate regimes of the Geneva Conventions would continue to govern as the lex specialis.
51
Most human rights instruments permit states to derogate from certain human rights
obligations, including the obligations relating to detention, during declared national emergencies. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
27, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 4, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 172 (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter
ECHR]. But see Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 [hereinafter African Charter]
(containing no explicit provision for derogation). Although the texts of these instruments
permit derogation from the obligations relating to detention, human rights bodies have asserted that no derogation is permitted from the obligation not to engage in arbitrary detention
or from the obligation to subject detention to judicial review. See, e.g., Human Rights
Comm., General Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), ¶¶ 11, 16 n.9, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General Comment 29]. For a discussion on the law governing detention during national emergencies, see generally GROSS & NÍ
ALOÁIN, supra note 23.
52
See Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N.
Doc A/HRC/C/17/Add. 3 (Oct. 25, 2007) (prepared by Martin Scheinin); Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 375, 377 (2005).
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non-international armed conflicts generally are suspected criminals (not
privileged combatants) alleged to have committed criminal acts.53 Administrative detention remains an option because such detention may be best
suited to prevent continued fighting, and because states engaged in such
conflicts are not expected to devote their law enforcement and other security
resources primarily to the process of criminal prosecution and conviction.54
C.

Detention Under Human Rights Law

The reflexive response to the problems with detaining nonbattlefield terrorism suspects under the law of armed conflict has been to
invoke the criminal law—i.e., to assert that the fight against terrorism is not
an armed conflict, and that human rights law governs to permit detention
exclusively through the criminal process.55 There is no question that the
criminal process is a relatively fair and transparent mechanism for detaining
terrorism suspects, and that in many circumstances it may also be effective,
in that it may permit states to detain for extended periods persons who have
committed past criminal acts and who continue to threaten state security.
53

See COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 1344.
As described in the text, the decision process for identifying the governing detention
regime is as follows:
54

55

See supra notes 12, 24.
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The question, however, is whether human rights law does or should require
states that face a serious threat from transnational jihadi terrorism to detain
non-battlefield suspects exclusively through the criminal process. This Section argues, contrary to the predominant assumption, that human rights law
also permits states to detain at least some such suspects administratively, in
order to protect the public from future attacks. Before examining the current
law on administrative detention, however, this Section explores why states
might legitimately seek an alternative to the criminal process for containing
the threat that non-battlefield terrorism suspects may pose.
1.

Criminal Detention

The criminal process is not quite the right model for detention in the
fight against terrorism: its focus is retrospective, rather than prospective; it
is maladroit for transnational operation; and it often fails to accommodate
the tools used and evidence available in terrorism cases. Because of these
incompatibilities, states that face a real threat from transnational terrorism
but detain exclusively through the criminal process will absorb certain costs.
Most of these costs go to the state’s security interests, because the criminal
process will obstruct efforts to detain suspects until after they participate in
an attack (if ever). Yet states that rely exclusively on the criminal process
also may undermine certain liberty interests. These states will face tremendous pressure to adjust their criminal laws to make them more effective in
terrorism cases. They therefore risk contaminating the law as it applies to
more ordinary offenses. Moreover, reliance on the criminal process may
enable these states to detain suspects for rather lengthy periods before trial
and thus without any determination that detention is necessary.56 This Section elaborates on the incompatibilities between the criminal process and
non-battlefield detention in order to explain why states might reasonably
seek alternative options for detention in the fight against terrorism.
First, the criminal process is conceptually incongruous with the
preventative goals of non-battlefield detention, because it is retrospective in
focus. Condemnation and punishment are appropriate only after the suspect
has committed a proscribed act. By contrast, detentions in the fight against
terrorism are predominantly prospective, focused not on punishing for a
prior act, but on preventing future ones. To be sure, most criminal justice
systems have mechanisms for moderating that retrospective focus and using
the law proactively. For instance, states may proscribe preparatory and supporting acts or may rely more heavily on inchoate offenses, like attempts

56

See generally Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1 (2006) (demonstrating that pretrial detention is permitted in the United States
without any evidentiary showing that the detainee committed a wrongful act).
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and conspiracy.57 Ordinarily, however, the retrospective nature of the criminal law continues to express itself through graded punishment schemes and
limiting legal doctrines that constrain the scope of application of the criminal proscription—for example, by requiring that a person charged with attempt be “dangerously close” to committing the crime, or that a person act
with purpose for a conviction of criminal conspiracy. These safeguards are
integral to the overall balance of a criminal justice system. Western democracies generally are willing to accept a certain level of criminal activity in
exchange for the assurance that individuals will not be criminally convicted
based on premature or indeterminate evidence.
Yet those same safeguards weaken the proactive force of the criminal law in the fight against terrorism, where the costs of accepting that level
of criminal activity may be substantially higher. States that rely exclusively
on the criminal process to detain non-battlefield suspects thus face an unenviable choice: They may maintain the ordinary safeguards of the criminal
process and accept that some terrorism suspects identified by law enforcement or intelligence officials will not be detained until after they participate
in an attack. Or they may adjust the criminal process in ways that undermine its safeguards but enable them to more effectively capture suspects
who have not yet but still might commit an attack.58 States will face significant pressure to choose the latter option, but doing so carries the potential
cost of contaminating the criminal process. Doctrines or interpretations developed in the terrorism context—and with transnational jihadi terrorists in
mind—may migrate outside that context to affect other areas of the criminal
law.59
Second, the criminal process is ill-equipped for the transnational nature of the fight against terrorism.60 The criminal process depends for its
57

Many states have strengthened their criminal laws in these ways. See GROSS & AOLÁIN,
supra note 23, at 402-04; Kent Roach, The Criminal Law and Terrorism, in GLOBAL ANTITERRORISM LAW & POLICY 129, 131-36 (Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor & Kent Roach eds.,
2005).
58
For a further discussion on the adjustments made to U.S. criminal law to facilitate terrorism prosecutions, see Robert M. Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008)
(manuscript at 23-32), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1055501. “[P]rosecutors have
responded to the prevention mandate with creative interpretations of existing statutes to
establish criminal liability . . . .” Id. at 23.
59
See generally GROSS & AOLÁIN, supra note 23, at 238-42 (demonstrating that generally
applicable legal rules may mutate in response to emergency related precedents and concerns); Roach, supra note 57, at 139 (“One danger is that extraordinary powers may be introduced and justified in the anti-terrorism context but then spread to other parts of the criminal
law.”).
60
Cf. Dominic D. McAlea, Post Westphalian Crime, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS?
APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 111, 119-20 (David Wippman &
Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005) (discussing the transnational nature of terrorism).
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success on effective and available law enforcement, but terrorists often take
harbor in states that lack the capability or political will to frustrate terrorism-related conduct in their territories. Some host states decline even to
investigate known terrorists.61 In these sorts of political environments, the
prospects for cooperative law enforcement are slim. The host governments
are unwilling to exercise their own law enforcement capabilities and are
unlikely to agree to the open exercise of law enforcement powers by a foreign state. In other instances, a host state may be willing to prosecute a
known terrorist but may be encumbered by ineffective tools of law enforcement. For instance, Abu Baker Bashir is widely believed to have participated in at least three major terrorist attacks and two foiled plots in Southeast Asia since December 2000.62 Yet Indonesia, which has twice tried Bashir, has been unable to sustain a conviction even for one terrorism-related
offense.63
What if, then, instead of prosecuting Bashir itself, Indonesia offered
to render him to the United States? This proposition is not entirely improbable. States that inadequately employ the tools of law enforcement may operate quite effectively through intelligence channels, because they may be
willing to do surreptitiously that which, for domestic political or legal reasons, they are unwilling or unable to do publicly. Indonesia itself has rendered at least two terrorism suspects to the United States, and the CIA reportedly sought to obtain custody of Bashir.64 U.S. officials, however, would
have a difficult time prosecuting Bashir in U.S. courts. The hurdles to collecting and amassing evidence in a foreign state are substantial and sometimes insurmountable. This is especially the case where the foreign state
obstructs (for domestic political or state sovereignty reasons) any joint or
unilateral law enforcement operation in its territory,65 or where the investi61

See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 115, 121-26 (2004) (describing the failure of Afghanistan and Pakistan to pursue
Osama bin Laden); David Blair, Al-Qa'eda Regroups in the Border Lands and Prepares for a
New Wave of Terror, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), May 31, 2007, at 20 (reporting that Pakistan
declined to conduct any police or military operations in its Waziristan region despite the
common understanding that al Qaeda’s leadership had reconstituted itself there).
62
See Paddock, supra note 3.
63
See Shawn Donnan & Taufan Hidayat, Jailed Indonesian to Be Freed, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), Mar. 10, 2004, at 11 (reporting that, in the first trial, Bashir was convicted only of a
minor immigration offense); Stephen Fitzpatrick & Natalie O’Brien, Hambali Could Have
Kept JI Leader in Jail, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 23, 2006, at 8 (reporting that, in the
second trial, Bashir was convicted of a terrorism-related offense but that that conviction was
overturned).
64
See Richard C. Paddock, Bashir Guilty in Bali Blasts, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at A6
(reporting that the United States sought to detain Bashir in the CIA program); Farah Stockman, Cleric’s Trial Tests US Antiterror Fight, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2005, at A1.
65
Cf. Jim Hoagland, Accountability and the Cole Attack, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2001, at
B7 (“FBI investigators [into the U.S.S. Cole bombing] have been hamstrung by Yemenis.”);
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gation concerns preparatory or supporting acts, in anticipation of a not-yetcompleted attack. Terrorism suspects who reside in states without effective
tools of law enforcement thus will be largely beyond the reach of the criminal law, at least until after they commit an attack.
Finally, the criminal process may require the application of domestic laws or procedures that, although perhaps appropriate for more ordinary
criminals, fail to accommodate the sorts of tools used and evidence available in terrorism cases. Terrorism cases rely heavily on intelligence information that states are averse to sharing in public fora, including judicial proceedings, for fear of exposing sources or methods.66 In the criminal cases
against Bashir, Indonesian prosecutors sought to use intelligence information or sources from the United States and Australia—two countries with a
particularly strong interest in Bashir being detained—but, in both cases,
those countries declined to share the evidence.67 The United States also refused to share such evidence with German officials prosecuting an accomplice to the September 11 attacks. In the German case, the conviction of the
9/11 accomplice was overturned on the ground that, although the government had made its case, the defendant could not adequately develop his
defense without an intelligence source that the United States refused to
share.68
Further, even where a state does share such information, it may be
inadmissible in court or may fail to satisfy the heightened burdens of proof
of a criminal trial. Intelligence operations are designed to obtain information
as quickly and surreptitiously as possible; they are not, like law enforcement
operations, designed to meticulously accumulate evidence in ways that can
withstand challenges to admissibility in court.69 In the United States, intelligence evidence may be inadmissible if it is hearsay or was obtained without a warrant. In the Netherlands, prosecutors have lost at least two major
David A. Vise & Vernon Loeb, U.S. Team May Face Difficulties in Probe, WASH. POST, Oct.
14, 2000, at A18 (describing the bulky U.S. criminal investigation in Yemen and the practical difficulties of investigating there).
66
See Christoph J.M. Safferling, Terror and Law: German Responses to 9/11, 4 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 1152, 1162 (2006).
67
See id.; Raymond Bonner, Indonesia Brings New Case Against Cleric Tied to Terror,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at A7; Raymond Bonner, Indonesians Answer Critics of Trial
Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, at A17.
68
Craig Whitlock, Terror Suspects Beating Charges Filed in Europe, WASH. POST, May
31, 2004, at A1. The defendant in that case, a Moroccan man named Mounir el-Motassadeq,
was retried and convicted in January 2007 for being an accessory in the murders of the airplane passengers who died in the attacks, but not in the other murders of the day. See Mark
Landler, 9/11 Associate Is Sentenced in Germany to 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at
A10.
69
See Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 327-40 (2003).
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terrorism cases after judges ruled that evidence obtained by intelligence
agencies was inadmissible.70 And in Bashir’s case, video-link evidence from
Singapore could not be used because it did not comply with rules designed
to prevent tampering with witnesses.71
The criminal process thus is conceptually and sometimes operationally inapt to detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects before they strike.
Some states may choose to live with these problems. After all, states that
readily discard the safeguards of the criminal process risk detaining arbitrarily or without sufficient controls. Yet states that detain non-battlefield suspects exclusively through this process risk contaminating their criminal justice systems and hamstringing themselves against preventing future attacks.
2.

Administrative Detention

Other states may decide that, for certain non-battlefield terrorism
suspects, the criminal process strikes the wrong balance between liberty and
security. These states already have an alternative option for detention under
international human rights law. Human rights law permits states to detain
persons who pose a serious security threat—just as it permits states to detain
persons who are awaiting deportation or who endanger public safety due to
mental illness—not only through the criminal process, but also through calibrated systems of administrative detention.72 The option of administrative
70

See Whitlock, supra note 68.
See Tim Lindsey & Jeremy Kingsley, Letter, Voice with a Different Message, HERALD
SUN (Austl.), Dec. 25, 2006, at 17, available at 2006 WLNR 22459924.
72
Human rights actors regularly acknowledge that security-based administrative detention
may be lawful. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention
of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Report on the Practice of Administrative Detention,
¶ 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/29 (July 24, 1990) (prepared by Louis Joinet) [hereinafter Joinet Report] (“[A]dministrative detention is not banned on principle under international
rules . . . .”); Human Rights Comm’n, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
¶¶ 84-85, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3 (Dec. 15, 2003) (acknowledging that administrative
detention may be appropriate in the counterterrorism context); Human Rights Comm., General Comment 8, Right to Liberty and Security of Persons (Article 9) (June 30, 1982), reprinted in Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 29, 1994)
[hereinafter General Comment 8] (acknowledging that administrative detention is sometimes
lawful); Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 66/1980: Uruguay, ¶ 18.1, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/17/D/66/1980 (Oct. 12, 1982) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Schweizer v.
Uruguay] (“[A]dministrative detention may not be objectionable in circumstances where the
person concerned constitutes a clear and serious threat to society which cannot be contained
in any other manner . . . .”); Helena Cook, Preventive Detention—International Standards
and the Protection of the Individual, in PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 1, 1 (Stanislaw Frankowski & Dinah Shelton eds., 1992)
(“In some circumstances preventive detention may be a legitimate means of social protection
and control.”); Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 25 (asserting that states may detain
persons outside the armed-conflict and criminal models “for imperative reasons of security”).
71
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detention, however, has been overlooked in the international legal debate on
non-battlefield detentions.
Human rights law establishes both procedural and substantive constraints on administrative detention to protect against abuse. The procedural
constraints are designed as safeguards against mistaken, unlawful, or arbitrary detentions. Any detention must be grounded in law,73 meaning that
states must prescribe in advance the permissible bases for detention and
then follow their own laws.74 Moreover, states must inform a detainee immediately of the reasons for his detention,75 and must afford him the opportunity for prompt judicial review.76 These constraints are intended to induce
institutional checks and balances and perform critical backstopping functions. The decision to detain may not be made by one person or institution,
but must instead be based on the prior reflection and deliberation of the legislature (or, in a common law system, the courts) and subject to the oversight of an independent and impartial judiciary. The procedural constraints,
therefore, are critical to preventing abuse. Yet, because they ultimately may
be satisfied by reference to a state’s own laws, they are not always suffiAlthough human rights actors regularly acknowledge that security-based administrative
detention may be lawful, they have repeatedly failed to establish meaningful parameters for
it, except to assert that it should be used only in exceptional cases. See, e.g., Joinet Report,
supra at 4 (“[G]overnments might at the very least might be expected to use [administrative
detentions] only in truly exceptional cases . . . .”); Human Rights Comm., Consideration of
Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.44 (Nov. 23, 1994) (recommending
to Morocco “that measures of administrative detention and incommunicado detention be
restricted to very limited and exceptional cases”); INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, ICJ
MEMORANDUM ON INT'L LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION AND COUNTERTERRORISM, at 11-12, 18 (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter ICJ MEMO].
73
See African Charter, supra note 51, art. 6 (prohibiting detentions that are not prescribed
by law); American Convention, supra note 51, art. 7(2)-(3) (same); ICCPR, supra note 51,
art. 9(1) (same); ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5 (same).
74
See Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 114, 13031 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
75
See African Charter, supra note 51, art. 7(2); ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9(2); ECHR,
supra note 51, art. 5(2); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 cmt. h (1986)
(asserting that, under customary law, a detention will be arbitrary if “not accompanied by a
notice of charges”); see also General Comment 8, supra note 72, at 8-9 (asserting that Article
9(2) of the ICCPR requires states to inform administrative detainees, and not just criminal
detainees, of the reasons for detention).
76
See African Charter, supra note 51, art. 7(1)(a); American Convention, supra note 51,
art. 7(5); ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9(4); ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5(4). Some international
actors have suggested that human rights law also requires that any detainee be provided with
access to legal counsel. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel, ¶
13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel 2003]; Louise Arbour, In Our Name and on Our Behalf, 55
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 511, 519 (2006).
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cient. For example, an overzealous state may satisfy the procedural constraints on detention by passing legislation permitting the detention of political dissidents and then affording suspected dissidents judicial review on the
determination that they are dissidents. If the state’s substantive law permits
such detention, then judicial review and the other procedural safeguards will
not protect against it.
Human rights law addresses that concern by imposing separate,
substantive constraints designed to restrict the circumstances under which
detention is lawful. These substantive constraints vary based on the source
of law. Customary and most conventional law prohibits “arbitrary” detention without specifying the circumstances that render a detention arbitrary.77
The test of arbitrariness that has developed in international law is factspecific: whether a particular detention is reasonably necessary to satisfy a
legitimate government interest.78 In the example of the overzealous state,
the government interest—silencing or reeducating political dissidents—
would almost certainly be considered illegitimate, and the detention unlawful for arbitrariness.
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) takes a
slightly different approach from the other human rights instruments. Instead
of specifically prohibiting arbitrary detentions,79 it delineates an exhaustive
list of the circumstances in which detention is permitted. The ECHR specifically permits detention, inter alia, for noncompliance with a lawful court
order, for immigration control, of persons “of unsound mind,” to bring a
person before a competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion that he
77

See African Charter, supra note 51, art. 6 (prohibiting detentions that are arbitrary);
American Convention, supra note 51, art. 7(2)-(3) (same); ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9(1)
(same); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 9, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (reflecting the customary international rule that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary . . . detention”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702(e) (1990) (“A State violates [customary] international law if,
as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones . . . prolonged arbitrary detention.”).
78
See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1324/2004: Australia, ¶ 7.2, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004 (Nov. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Shafiq v.
Australia] (detention could be arbitrary if “not necessary in all the circumstances of the case
and proportionate to the ends sought”); Human Rights Comm., Communication No.
560/1993: Australia, ¶ 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 3, 1997) [hereinafter
Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia] (same if “not necessary in all the circumstances of
the case”); Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 305/1988: Netherlands, ¶ 5.8, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (Aug. 15, 1990) (same if not “reasonable in all the circumstances”); see also Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of
Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 507 (2003).
79
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the ECHR to contain an implicit
requirement of non-arbitrariness, see Winterwerp v. Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
17-18 (1979), but that requirement may be satisfied procedurally, see infra notes 88-90 and
accompanying text.
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has committed a criminal offense, or when reasonably necessary, to prevent
him from committing such an offense.80 States parties to the ECHR must fit
any administrative detention within one of these categories for which detention has been deemed justifiable.
The human rights instruments thus outline a structure for administrative detention that, when used for reasons of national security, falls
somewhere between armed-conflict detention and criminal detention. Like
detention under the law of armed conflict, administrative detention is preventative. Its focus is on incapacitating persons who pose a future security
threat, not on punishing them for past harms. Moreover, because administrative detention is outside the criminal process, it need not be subject to country-specific rules of criminal law or procedure that, although perhaps appropriate for more ordinary criminals, may strike the wrong balance between
liberty and security in the context of particular terrorism suspects. Yet, as
with criminal detention, administrative detention must be objectively necessary or justified and must be subject to meaningful judicial review. Given
the inadequacies of the armed-conflict and criminal models, and given the
nature of the fight against terrorism—in that it has some but not other
attributes of an armed conflict— administrative detention presents a potentially appealing legal framework for detaining non-battlefield terrorism suspects. Its appeal, however, depends largely on how it is implemented.
III. EXAMINING ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION
Where administrative detention is used for reasons of national security, it tends to be implemented in one of three ways: (1) detention prior to
filing criminal charges; (2) detention pending deportation; and (3) “pure”
security-based detention premised only on the interest in containing the
security threat. At first blush, it might appear to be relatively uncomplicated
to assess, on a case-by-case basis, the legality of such detentions by reference to the procedural and substantive constraints described above. In practice, however, the substantive constraints that international law imposes on
detention have proven insufficient in the security context. Thus, although
the law permits security-based administrative detention, it currently is inadequate to govern non-battlefield detentions in the fight against terrorism.
This Part demonstrates the insufficiency of the existing substantive
constraints on administrative detention by reviewing the jurisprudence of
two prominent human rights bodies: the Human Rights Committee under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
European Court of Human Rights under the ECHR.81 The Human Rights
Committee reviews administrative detentions under a standard of non80
81

See ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5(1).
See also sources cited supra note 72.
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arbitrariness, which it has interpreted to mean that detention must be reasonably necessary to satisfy a legitimate government interest.82 That test is
meaningless in the security context. All governments have a legitimate interest in protecting against serious threats to national security, and the determination that a threat renders detention necessary is not easily reviewed.83 Such determinations are based on classified evidence and risk
assessments that may not be available to review bodies and on which they
have no expertise. The committee deals with that problem simply by neglecting the standard of non-arbitrariness and emphasizing instead the
ICCPR’s procedural constraints on detention. As a result, the standard of
non-arbitrariness remains underdeveloped. There is, in other words, almost
no guidance on when security-based administrative detention may be lawful
under the ICCPR, and when it is unlawful for arbitrariness.
The problem under the ECHR is slightly different. The substantive
constraint under the ECHR is the requirement that any detention fall within
one of the categories for which it is specifically permitted. Under the court’s
jurisprudence, the ECHR permits security-based detention predicated on
other proceedings (for example, criminal trial or deportation) irrespective of
any showing of actual necessity, but it prohibits pure security-based detention, even if objectively necessary to contain a serious security threat. This
framework creates an incentive for states to detain under the false pretense
of future criminal or immigration proceedings, even where such proceedings are not forthcoming. Indeed, Part IV demonstrates that a number of
states have done just that.
A.

Detention Predicated on Criminal or Immigration Proceedings

The European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights
Committee both review leniently detentions predicated on future criminal or
immigration proceedings. In the case of future criminal proceedings, the
ECHR specifically permits detention “on reasonable suspicion [that a person has] committed an offense.”84 The European Court of Human Rights has
explained that a state may detain persons under that provision where the
state intends to pursue criminal charges, even if it never does.85 Thus, in
Brogan v. United Kingdom, the court found that the United Kingdom did
not violate the ECHR’s substantive constraint when it detained terrorism
suspects for as long as seven days without filing any criminal charges

82

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Cf. GROSS & ALOÁIN, supra note 23, at 264-67 (describing the difficulty international
bodies have in reviewing official justifications for resorting to emergency measures).
84
ECHR, supra note 51, § I, art. 5(1)(c).
85
Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16, 29 (1988).
83
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against them.86 With respect to future immigration proceedings, the ECHR
permits detention “with a view to deportation.”87 In Chahal v. United Kingdom, the court explained that a state may detain under that provision so long
as deportation proceedings are diligently pursued and the decision to detain
is not arbitrary.88 Notably, however, the court did not adopt the traditional
international test of non-arbitrariness that requires a showing of reasonable
necessity.89 Instead, it understood that standard in purely procedural terms.
Even though the detainee in Chahal contested the determination that he
posed a security threat, the court declined to review that determination on
the ground that the domestic processes for making it were sufficiently elaborate to protect against arbitrariness.90 The European Court of Human
Rights thus has upheld security-based detentions predicated on future criminal or immigration proceedings without making any independent determination that detention is necessary or justified.91
Under the ICCPR, the existence of future criminal or immigration
proceedings does not necessarily satisfy the standard of non-arbitrariness
because the committee interprets that standard to require that detention in
each case be reasonably, or objectively, necessary to satisfy the government
interest. Nevertheless, the committee declines to review necessity determinations in cases involving claims of national security. By default, then, the
committee declines to find that security-based detentions predicated on
86

Id. at 16.
ECHR, supra note 51, § I, art. 5(1)(f).
88
App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, 465-66 (1996).
89
Id. at 464 (asserting that the ECHR “does not demand that the detention of a person
against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation be reasonably considered
necessary . . . . all that is required . . . is that ‘action is being taken with a view to deportation’”); id. at 466-67.
90
Id. at 464; see also Saadi v. United Kingdon, App. No. 13229/03, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep
1005, 1015-16 (2007) (rejecting the detainee’s claim of arbitrariness for lack of necessity in
part because “domestic law provided a system of safeguards”). But cf. id. at 1015 (suggesting
that the ECHR standard of non-arbitrariness may have a substantive element to it, to the
extent it limits the permissible duration of detention).
91
See also, e.g., Conka v. Belgium, App. No. 51564/99, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1298, 1299
(2002) (reiterating that detentions predicated on deportation proceedings need not be necessary); Assenov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 24760/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 652, 656-58 (1999) (focusing on the procedures for pretrial detention without making any independent assessment
of necessity). Note that the European Court of Human Rights engages in a somewhat more
probing review of pretrial detention than of pre-deportation detention. See Chahal, 23 Eur.
H.R. Rep. at 464. Nevertheless, that review does not involve an independent determination of
necessity or justification. Instead, it consists of an examination of whether domestic bodies
have set forth “relevant” and “sufficient” grounds for detention. See, e.g., Lind v. Russia,
App. No. 25664/05, ¶ 71 (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/sea
rch.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search for term “Lind,” then follow the link “Case of Lind v. Russia”).
87
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criminal or immigration proceedings are arbitrary. For instance, in Bandajevsky v. Belarus, the committee reviewed a pre-charge detention that lasted
twenty-three days.92 Belarus asserted that the detention was necessary on
the ground that the detainee was involved in particularly dangerous criminal
conduct. Of course, Belarus had not yet tried the detainee, so it had not yet
proven that he was, in fact, involved in conduct necessitating detention. The
committee, however, declined to probe Belarus’s necessity determination or
to otherwise give texture to the standard of non-arbitrariness. It found, simply, that the detainee had failed to make a showing of arbitrariness.93 The
committee likewise avoided that standard in Ahani v. Canada, a case involving a nine-year detention pending deportation on national security
grounds.94 In that case, the committee asserted, without further discussion,
that “detention on the basis of a security certification by two Ministers on
national security grounds does not result ipso facto in arbitrary detention.”95
It then shifted its focus to the ICCPR’s procedural constraints on detention.96

92

Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1100/2002: Belarus, ¶ 10.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/86/D/1100/2002 (Apr. 18, 2006). The author of this claim was not suspected of
engaging in terrorist activity but was charged under a presidential decree relating to “the
fight of terrorism and other particularly dangerous violent crimes.” Id. According to Belarus,
he was the leader of a particularly dangerous organized criminal group. Id.
93
Id.
94
Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1051/2002: Canada, ¶ 4.13, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002 (June 15, 2004) (hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Ahani v. Canada).
95
Id. ¶ 10.2.
96
For a more thorough discussion of this decision, see Gerald Heckman, International Decisions: Ahani v. Canada, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 699 (2006). Note that the Human Rights Committee engages in a significantly more probing review of immigration detention where the asserted justification for detention is related not to national security, but instead to general
immigration policy. Even absent a national security claim, the committee recognizes that
states may have a legitimate interest in detaining foreign nationals pending deportation. See,
e.g., Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia, supra note 78, ¶ 9.3 (“[T]here is no basis for the
author’s claim that it is per se arbitrary to detain individuals requesting asylum.”); SARAH
JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 312-19 (2d ed. 2005) (reviewing
the committee’s jurisprudence acknowledging that administrative detention for immigration
control may in some instances be lawful). Yet the committee requires states to justify such
detention in terms of individualized assessments of necessity and with periodic reviews. See,
e.g., Human Rights Comm., Shafiq v. Australia, supra note 78, ¶ 7.2 (finding immigration
detention arbitrary because it is based only on a general policy goal of not admitting uncleared immigrants and not on an individualized assessment); Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1050/2002: Australia, ¶ 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1050/2002, (Aug. 9,
2006) (same); Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia, supra note 78, ¶ 9.3 (finding immigration detention arbitrary because there was insufficient justification for extended detention).
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Pure Security-Based Detention

Detentions predicated on criminal or immigration proceedings
purport to further two separate government interests: the interest in containing the security threat, and the interest in either trying and punishing or deporting the individual. The second government interest thus serves as a sort
of substantive check on detention—explicitly under the ECHR and by default under the ICCPR. In cases involving pure security-based detention,
however, no other government interest exists. The purpose of detention is
only to contain the security threat. In these cases, the European Court of
Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee have reached very different results.
The European Court of Human Rights has suggested that pure security-based detention is unlawful under the ECHR. The ECHR permits detention “for the purpose of bringing [a person] before the competent legal authority . . . when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offense.”97 The court, however, has interpreted that provision to
permit detention only if tied to criminal proceedings, and not if taken to
incapacitate a person who otherwise poses a threat or has a general propensity for crime.98 This jurisprudence reflects the peacetime premise of the
ECHR,99 and may not be entirely appropriate in the fight against terrorism.
But unless the ECHR is amended or reinterpreted in the context of that
fight, states parties to it must squeeze any security-based detention into one
of the other ECHR categories.
By contrast, pure security-based detention is permitted under the
ICCPR, so long as it is reasonably necessary to contain the security threat.
The problem, again, is that the Human Rights Committee has provided almost no guidance on when security-based detention should be considered
reasonably necessary. Even when reviewing the detentions by the United
States at Guantánamo Bay—which it apparently did under the lens of administrative detention—the committee focused only on the ICCPR’s procedural constraints. It criticized the inadequacy of process at Guantánamo Bay
and encouraged the United States to afford all Guantánamo detainees “proceedings before a court to decide, without delay, on the lawfulness of their
97

ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5(1)(c).
See, e.g., Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 13-15, 48 (1961); see
also Ciulla v. Italy, 148 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1, ¶ 38 (1989); Guzzardi v. Italy, 3 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 333, 367-68, ¶ 102 (1980). But cf. Ericksen v. Norway (No. 37), 1997-III Eur.
Ct. H.R. 839, ¶¶ 85-86 (1997) (finding detention after conviction and sentence justified, in
light of the detainee’s “impaired mental state and . . . foreseeable propensity for violence,”
because the detention was “closely linked to the original criminal proceedings”).
99
Cf. Gerald L. Neuman, Comment, Counter-Terrorist Operations and the Rule of Law,
15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1019, 1021 (2004) (“The text of the European Convention suggests that it
was not designed to regulate the conduct of war.”).
98
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detention or order their release.”100 But it did not suggest that the requisite
process could be afforded only under the criminal law, and it did not address whether the Guantánamo detentions would be unlawful (as arbitrary)
even if accompanied by adequate legal process.
The committee’s neglect of the standard of non-arbitrariness is endemic to its jurisprudence on pure security-based detention. Many states
that engage in such detention deny their practices or detain in ways that
blatantly violate the ICCPR’s procedural constraints. In these instances, the
committee condemns only the procedural violation or otherwise ducks the
question of arbitrariness.101 The committee also ducks that question, however, when reviewing the practice of states that admit to administering such
detention and that purport to do so in a manner consistent with their ICCPR
obligations. For instance, India and Israel each ratified the ICCPR with
statements designed to preserve the legality of pure security-based detention.102 In its 1996 report under the ICCPR, India acknowledged that it employed such detention in response to a “sustained campaign of terrorism” in
its territory.103 India asserted that such detention was permitted if necessary
to prevent a person from threatening public order or security, but India did
not specify the circumstances in which that might be the case, and it did not
100

Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:
United States of America, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006).
101
See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1297/2004: Algeria, ¶ 8.5, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1297/2004 (Aug. 9, 2006) (finding the detention of a terrorist suspect
unlawful “[i]n the absence of adequate explanations from the state party concerning the
author’s allegations”); Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1044/2002: Tajikistan, ¶
8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1044/2002 (Apr. 26, 2002) (finding the detention of a bombing
suspect unlawful based on the state’s failure to refute the claim of unlawfulness); Human
Rights Comm., Schweizer v. Uruguay, supra note 72, ¶ 18.1 (finding that it was not “in a
position to pronounce itself on the general compatibility of the regime of ‘prompt security
measures’ under Uruguayan law with the Covenant”).
102
India ratified the ICCPR with a reservation clarifying that it would interpret the ICCPR
provisions on detentions to permit pure security-based detention taken consistent with the
Indian Constitution. See Human Rights Comm., Reservations, Declarations, Notifications
and Objections Relating to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Optional Protocols Thereto, at 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2/Rev.4 (Aug. 24, 1994) [hereinafter
ICCPR Reservations]; see also Derek Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency:
Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 311, 351-54 (2001).
Notably, other states did not object to this reservation, even though a few did object to India’s reservation on a different ICCPR provision. See ICCPR Reservations, supra, at 53-56
(objections of France, Germany, and the Netherlands). Israel ratified the ICCPR with a notification that it intended to exercise powers of arrest and detention as required by the exigencies of its situation. Israel hedged on whether the exercise of such powers would be inconsistent with the ICCPR so as to require derogation; it derogated from the detention provisions
insofar as was necessary. Id. at 27-28.
103
Human Rights Comm., Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1992: India, ¶
50, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/Add.6 (June 17, 2006).
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attempt to demonstrate that it satisfied that standard.104 The committee nevertheless was silent on the issue of arbitrariness. It expressed “regrets that
the use of special powers of detention remains widespread” in India, and
then accepted that India could continue to detain persons administratively
for reasons of national security, so long as it satisfied the procedural constraints on detention.105
The committee has been slightly more assertive in its observations
on Israel. With Israel, the committee has raised two concerns that appear to
go to the standard of non-arbitrariness, although even here it has not expressed itself in those terms. First, the committee asserted in 1998 that it had
“specific concern” that “at least some of the persons kept in administrative
detention for reasons of State security . . . do not personally threaten State
security but are kept as ‘bargaining chips’ in order to promote negotiations
with other parties.”106 This concern presumably goes to the requirement of
non-arbitrariness, because Israel’s practice of detaining persons as bargaining chips is not prohibited by any of the procedural constraints on detention.
The implication is that detention is arbitrary (at least in the committee’s
view) if it is based, not on an individualized assessment of necessity, but on
a broader state interest unrelated to the particular persons being detained.107
Israel later seemed to accept that view. In its subsequent report to the committee, Israel acknowledged that international law prohibits (again, presumably as arbitrary) the detention of persons who do not themselves pose a
security threat but who may be useful bargaining chips in future negotiations.108
Second, the committee has expressed concern with the duration of
detention in Israel.109 This concern highlights but does not resolve a tension
inherent in pure security-based detention. In the immigration context, the
committee acknowledges that even rather lengthy detentions may be nonarbitrary (recall that the detention in Ahani lasted nine years),110 so long as

104

Id. ¶ 55.
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: India, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.81 (Aug. 4, 1997).
106
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel 1998].
107
Cf. supra text accompanying note 96 (discussing requirement for individualized assessment in cases involving immigration detention not based on national security concerns).
108
See Human Rights Comm., Second Periodic Report Addendum: Israel, ¶¶ 125-28, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (Dec. 4, 2001).
109
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel 1998, supra note 106, ¶ 21;
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Israel 2003, supra note 76, ¶ 13.
110
Human Rights Comm., Ahani v. Canada, supra note 94.
105
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the detaining state periodically reassesses the necessity of detention.111 Unlike detentions predicated on deportation, however, pure security-based
detentions have no intrinsic mechanism for establishing an end-date to detention. Various actors have therefore suggested that such detention must in
some way be temporally constrained—i.e., that an otherwise lawful detention may become arbitrary or unlawful if it is exceptionally lengthy or if
there is a possibility that it could last indefinitely.112 Nevertheless, there is
no shared understanding as to the point at which a detention becomes arbitrary by virtue of its duration.
The committee’s jurisprudence on security-based detention thus
fails to give any texture to the standard of non-arbitrariness. The committee
repeatedly avoids that standard to emphasize, instead, the procedural constraints on detention. At best, the committee has suggested that detention
may be arbitrary and therefore unlawful, if it is not based on an individualized assessment of necessity or if it is unduly lengthy. Some states appear
to accept those suggestions, but only in very narrow or unspecified terms.
IV. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE: GROPING FOR ALTERNATIVES
At this point, one might reasonably argue that choosing a suitable
detention model for non-battlefield terrorism suspects is essentially a judgment call. An international legal argument may be made for each of the
models (except possibly for the pure security-based administrative model
under the ECHR), and none is cost-free. The armed-conflict model is consistent with the preventative goals of non-battlefield detention, but its liberty
111
See Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia, supra note 78, ¶ 9.4 (“[E]very decision to
keep a person in detention should be open to review periodically so the grounds justifying
the detention can be assessed. In any event, detention should not continue beyond the period
for which the State can provide appropriate justification.”); see also Human Rights Comm.,
Concluding Observations: Japan, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.102 (Nov. 19, 1998)
(noting that persons were detained for up to two years pending immigration proceedings but
expressing concern only about the conditions of detention).
112
See Human Rights Comm’n, Letter Dated 19 March 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Singapore, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/157 (Mar. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm’n Letter] (underscoring that the duration of pure security-based detention
in Singapore is time-limited); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations: Cameroon,
¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.116 (Nov. 3, 1999) (expressing concern that “a person held
in administrative detention . . . may have his detention extended indefinitely”); ICJ MEMO,
supra note 72, at 12; Drew R. Atkins, Customary International Humanitarian Law and Multinational Military Operations in Malaysia, 16 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 79, 97 n.124 (2007)
(noting the two-year limit to pure security-based detention in Malaysia); Pejic, supra note 52,
at 382 (“[H]uman rights jurisprudence rejects the notion of indefinite detention.”); Sangeeta
Shah, The UK’s Anti-Terror Legislation and the House of Lords: The First Skirmish, 5 HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 403, 404-05 (2005) (describing the United Kingdom’s derogation from the
ECHR and the ICCPR to accommodate post-9/11 legislation permitting indefinite detention).
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costs are prohibitive: innocents easily could be detained, for extended periods if not for life, based only on a reasonable suspicion of threat and without any judicial guarantees. The criminal model is substantially more protective of individual liberties, but if used exclusively in the fight against
terrorism, it too carries with it potentially significant costs. States that have
no choice but to charge, prosecute, and convict terrorism suspects will inevitably adjust the criminal law to enhance its preventative capacity. They
therefore risk eroding the safeguards of their criminal justice systems and
contaminating the law as it applies in more ordinary cases. These states also
risk that some terrorism suspects identified by law enforcement and intelligence services will go uncontained—either because they live in states that
lack effective tools of law enforcement or because the tools used and information available are incompatible with the process of criminal trial and
conviction. Administrative detention is a potentially appealing in-between
system. Human rights actors regularly acknowledge that security-based administrative detention may be lawful, but as Part III demonstrated, they
have failed to establish adequate substantive controls on such detention.
This Part looks to international practice for guidance on the current
status of the law, and on the direction in which it is moving. It demonstrates
that international actors—and particularly western democracies that take
seriously their human rights obligations, but also face a serious threat from
transnational jihadi terrorism—are dissatisfied with both the armed-conflict
model and exclusive reliance on the criminal model. Most states have declined to apply the law of armed conflict to detain non-battlefield suspects
because the liberty and public relations costs are too high. Yet several states
have also demonstrated that they perceive an occasional but serious need to
contain the threat from non-battlefield suspects outside the criminal process.
In the absence of any international guidance for satisfying that need, these
states have been willing to resort to a variety of ad hoc or uncontrolled
measures.
Some of these measures have been taken discreetly or have encountered strong condemnation; they therefore cannot be understood to reflect
collective expectations on what the law does or should permit.113 But other
measures—and specifically measures of administrative detention—have
been pursued overtly, and with legislative and judicial participation. These
latter measures have not all been upright, but they indicate that states are
groping for an alternative legal framework within which to satisfy their perceived security needs.

113

With respect to identifying state expectations, see Andrew R. Willard, Incidents: An
Essay on Method, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS 25 (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R.
Willard eds., 1988).
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Rejecting the Armed-Conflict Approach

The United States has almost singularly114 asserted the authority to
detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects based on the law of armed conflict.115 U.S. detention practices—under the CIA program and at Guantánamo Bay— have therefore been at the center of the international conversation
on applying the law of armed conflict to non-battlefield suspects. The international reaction to these practices has been intensely negative. From a systemic perspective, that reaction is strong evidence that the current law of
armed conflict does not properly govern non-battlefield detentions.
The United States has invoked the law of armed conflict to justify
various forms of non-battlefield detention. Some non-battlefield suspects
have been detained in secret CIA “dark sites” without any legal process at
all.116 Others have been detained at Guantánamo Bay.117 Still others have
been detained at secure facilities on U.S. soil.118 The common feature among
all such detentions is their armed-conflict premise.
The reaction to those detention practices from actors outside the
United States has been extraordinarily negative. The facility at Guantánamo
Bay, in particular, has become a symbol of injustice around the world,119
114

But cf. Lynn Welchman, Rocks, Hard Places and Human Rights: Anti-Terrorism Law
and Policy in Arab States, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY, supra note 57, at
581, 582 (“[T]housands have been arrested in Arab states, many held for prolonged periods
without trial.”); Michael Slackman, Saudis Round Up 172, Citing A Plot Against Oil Rigs,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2007, at A1 (reporting on the arrest and detention of 172 persons connected to a terrorist ring, and quoting a Saudi official as asserting that there is “still a war
going on” against terrorism).
115
See supra note 6; infra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
116
See President’s Speech on Military Commissions, supra note 9 (asserting that the CIA
detention program holds “a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during the war”) (emphasis added); Monica Hakimi, The Council of Europe Addresses
CIA Rendition and Detention Program, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 442, 442 (2007) (discussing and
collecting sources on the CIA program).
117
For recent government arguments that premise Guantánamo detentions on an armed
conflict, see Brief for Respondent at 2, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195 (U.S. Oct. 9,
2007); Brief for Respondent at 2, 7-8, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05184).
118
Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted, No. 06-7427
(4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2007) (non-citizen captured and detained as an enemy combatant in the
United States); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005) (U.S. citizen captured and
detained as an enemy combatant in the United States).
119
See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Briton Wants Guantánamo Closed, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2006,
at A24 (quoting the British attorney general as asserting that “[t]he existence of Guantánamo
remains unacceptable” and that it has become “a symbol to many—right or wrong—of injustice”); Mark Mazzetti, General Rejects Call to Penalize Ex-Guantanamo Prison Chief, L.A.
TIMES, July 13, 2005, at A11 (“The U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay has been the source of
intense anger throughout the Arab world.”); Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, New to Pentagon, Gates Argued for Closing Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at A1 (quoting
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such that even close European allies of the United States demand that it be
closed.120 International human rights bodies have been even more outspoken. These bodies have focused on the deficiencies of legal process available to terrorism detainees in U.S. custody.121 The Human Rights Committee
and the Committee Against Torture have each criticized the insufficiency of
legal process at Guantánamo Bay,122 and the Council of Europe has condemned the absence of any legal process under the CIA program.123 Finally,
the heads of five mechanisms under the U.N. Human Rights Commission
have concluded that non-battlefield detainees at Guantánamo should be either subjected to criminal process or released.124 The U.N. SecretaryGeneral publicly supported that conclusion, asserting that “the basic point
that one cannot detain individuals in perpetuity and that charges have to be
brought against them and their being given a chance to explain themselves
and be prosecuted, charged or released . . . is something that is common
under any legal system.”125

Defense Secretary Gates as acknowledging that the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay has
“become so tainted abroad”).
120
See, e.g., John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: International Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 214, 232-36 (2006) (noting
the positions of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany); Hunger Strike at Guantanamo
Prison Grows to 89 Inmates, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at A23 (Germany, Denmark, and
United Kingdom); Dafna Linzer & Glenn Kessler, Decision to Move Detainees Resolved
Two-Year Debate Among Bush Advisers, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at A1 (Europe generally); Elaine Sciolino, Spanish Judge Calls for Closing U.S. Prison at Guantánamo, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2006, at A6 (Spain and United Kingdom); Craig Whitlock, Europeans Cheer
Ruling on Guantanamo Trials, WASH. POST, June 30, 2006, at A8 (Europe generally).
121
See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Situation
of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay, ¶¶ 21, 25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006)
[hereinafter Comm. on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees]; Eur. Comm. for Democracy
Through Law, Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member
States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, ¶¶
78-85, Doc. No. CDL-AD(2006)009 (Mar. 2006); Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Relevance of IHL in the Context of Terrorism (July 21, 2005), http://www.cicr.org/web/eng/site
eng0.nsf/html/terrorism-ihl-210705(rejecting the notion of a global armed conflict and then
asserting that “when a person suspected of terrorist activities is not detained in connection
with any armed conflict, humanitarian law does not apply”).
122
See Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations: United States of
America, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006); Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted By States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 18,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006).
123
See Hakimi, supra note 116, at 446.
124
Comm. on Human Rights, Situation of Detainees, supra note 121, ¶ 95.
125
See Warren Hoge, Investigators for UN Urge U.S. to Close Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2006, at A6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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. . . . But Evading the Criminal Process Discreetly

Most international actors have therefore declined to apply the law
of armed conflict to detain non-battlefield suspects. But the fact that other
actors have rejected the U.S. approach—and the overt use of the legal tools
under the law of armed conflict—does not mean that they fail to appreciate
the threat from transnational jihadi groups, or the armed-conflict attributes
of the fight against them. Even states that publicly criticize the U.S. approach have demonstrated that (at least in certain cases) they also perceive
advantages to it, or that they otherwise share the goal of responding to the
threat from non-battlefield suspects without resort to the criminal process.126
Several states have participated covertly in the very U.S. detention
practices that they publicly condemn.127 The extent of such participation has
varied. A few states have held and interrogated non-battlefield detainees in
coordination with the United States.128 But these states have notoriously
poor human rights records, so their practice is not necessarily reflective of
the direction of international law in this area. The participation of other
states— including those that take their human rights obligations seriously—
126

That other states share that goal is also evident from various public statements they have
made. For instance, the former Defense Minister of the United Kingdom has suggested revising the law of armed conflict to address terrorism-related detentions. See David Ignatius,
Editorial, A Way Out of Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, July 7, 2006, at A17. Austrian officials have acknowledged that Guantánamo Bay occupies a legal “gray area,” id., and have
proposed that Europe and the United States work together to establish a new “framework”
for terrorism-related renditions. Temporary Comm. on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transp. & Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Report on the Alleged Use
of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners,
¶ 25, EUR. PARL. Doc. A6-0020/2007 (Jan. 30, 2007) (prepared by Giovanni Claudio Fava)
[hereinafter EU Report on CIA]. Australian and Italian officials have publicly supported
detentions under the CIA program. See John Ward Anderson, Confirmation of CIA Prisons
Leaves Europeans Mistrustful, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at A8 (reporting on statement by
the Australian foreign minister supporting the CIA program); Tracy Wilkens, Court Widens
Net for 22 CIA Agents to EU, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A3 (reporting on statement by
then Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi that the CIA operation against Abu Omar was “justifiable”). Finally, German officials are now advocating the establishment of a system of extracriminal detention in that country. See Mark Landler, Debate on Terror Threat Stirs Germany, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A1.
127
See generally EU Report on CIA, supra note 126 (finding that European States acquiesced or participated in U.S. detentions); COE Report, supra note 13 (same); see also
Jimmy Burns, et al., Comment & Analysis, Render unto Washington: US Tactics on Terror
Are Making Europe Examine its Complicity, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 14, 2005, at 17 (reporting on the “uneasy arrangements by which European governments have appeared to collude
with the U.S. in practices that they have rarely been willing to defend, criticise or even acknowledge”).
128
See COE Report, supra note 13, ¶¶ 202-03 (naming Morocco); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: Annals of Justice, NEW YORKER MAG., Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, 107 (naming
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria).
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has been more subtle. For instance, there is some evidence that, under
NATO auspices, European states permitted the United States to use their
airspace to transport non-battlefield detainees into custody.129 There also is
strong evidence that European and other states shared intelligence giving
rise to detentions;130 interrogated detainees already in custody;131 declined to
accept their nationals or residents back into their territories, cognizant that
the alternative would be continued detention;132 and hosted CIA detention
facilities in their territories.133 Finally, the evidence indicates that several
states have themselves captured non-battlefield terrorism suspects and then
transferred them into U.S. or another state’s custody for extended, extracriminal detention.134
States have also evaded the criminal process by deporting nonbattlefield suspects despite the risk that the suspects would be mistreated in
129

See Council of Eur., Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and
Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States: Second Report,
¶¶ 72-83, EUR. PARL. Doc. 11302 rev. (June 11, 2007) (prepared by Dick Marty) [hereinafter
COE Second Report].
130
See COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO
MAHER ARER, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARER: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 13-14 (2006),available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_
English.pdf (Canada); COE Report, supra note 13, ¶¶ 163-76 (United Kingdom).
131
See COE Report, supra note 13, ¶ 201 (United Kingdom); id. ¶¶ 187, 191 (Germany);
Mark Landler & Souad Mekhennet, Freed German Detainee Questions His Country’s Role,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2006, at A8; Craig Smith, Leak Disrupts French Terror Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A8.
132
See, e.g., Landler & Mekhennet, supra note 131, at A8 (Germany); Whitlock, supra note
120, at A8 (Europe); Craig Whitlock, U.S. Faces Obstacles to Freeing Detainees, WASH.
POST, Oct. 17, 2006, at A1 (United Kingdom, Germany, and “other European States”).
133
See COE Second Report, supra note 129, ¶¶ 70, 117 (Thailand, Romania, and Poland).
134
See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (May 24, 2005) [hereinafter Comm. Against Torture, Agiza v. Sweden] (Sweden); COE Report, supra note 13, ¶¶ 133-49 (Bosnia & Herzegovina); id. ¶¶ 94132 (Macedonia); EU Report on CIA, supra note 126, ¶¶ 49-53 (Italy); Stockman, supra note
64 (Indonesia); Raymond Bonner, Indonesia Brings New Case Against Cleric Tied to Terror,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at A7 (Thailand); Mark Denbeaux & Joshua W. Denbeaux, Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees Through Analysis of Department
of Defense Data 14 (Seton Hall Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 46, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=885659 (Pakistan). The evidence suggests that, in some cases, governments acquiesced in extra-criminal detentions after it became apparent that they had no
other option for incapacitating the terrorism suspect. See, e.g., John Crewdson, Italy Says
CIA May Have Had Distorted View of Cleric, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2007, at CN12 (reporting
evidence that some Italian officials considered Abu Omar to be a threat in Italy but that they
could not deport him because of a prior grant of political asylum); Craig Whitlock, At Guantanamo, Caught in a Legal Trap, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2006, at A1 (reporting that the United States detained the “Algerian six” at Guantánamo Bay after Bosnian-Herzegovinian
courts ordered the local government to release them from criminal detention and prohibited it
from deporting them).
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their home countries. In the counterterrorism context, deportation is frequently from a western democracy to a country that is ambivalent about
human rights and that has an independent interest in containing the jihadi
threat. Deportation thus may result in arbitrary detention, detainee mistreatment, or execution in the detainee’s home country. Human rights law
generally prohibits refoulement where there is a real risk of such mistreatment, but states increasingly cope with that prohibition by obtaining from
the receiving state diplomatic assurances that deported suspects will not be
mistreated.135 These assurances are often unreliable.136 Western democracies
nevertheless use them to deport terrorism suspects because the alternative
may be an uncontained threat in their own territories.137 The diplomatic assurances thus provide a cover for potentially unlawful refoulements.
135

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STILL AT RISK: DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES NO SAFEGUARD
AGAINST TORTURE (2005), http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/index.htm (reviewing practices of the United States, Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Austria, and
Turkey); Katrin Bennhold, Europe, Too, Takes Harder Line in Handling Terrorism Suspects,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at A1 (citing Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and
the United Kingdom).
136
See Comm. Against Torture, Agiza v. Sweden, supra note 134, ¶ 13.4 (“The procurement
of diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement,
did not suffice to protect against this manifest risk [of torture upon deportation].”); Comm.
On Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6 (Dec. 23, 2005) (prepared by Manfred Nowak); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 135.
137
Three cases recently decided or now pending before the European Court of Human
Rights consider whether, when deporting a terrorism suspect, a state may balance the risk of
home-country mistreatment against the national security threat of having the suspect uncontained in its own territory: Saadi v. Italy, App. 37201/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); A. v. Netherlands, App. 4900/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006); and Ramzy v. Netherlands, App. 25424/05 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2005). See Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Application Lodged
with the Court Ramzy v. The Netherlands (Oct. 20, 2005), available at http://www.echr.coe
.int/eng/press/2005/oct/applicationlodgedramzyvnetherlands.htm; EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 2006, § 3, 9 (2007), available at http://www.ech
r.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D8BFD30E-EB6B-4FB9-86398990064DB046/0/CompilationofSec
tionreports.pdf (providing information regarding A. v. Netherlands). The United Kingdom
intervened in the Saadi case, and it and a few other states intervened in the other two cases,
arguing that, where the security threat posed by the terrorism suspect is grave, the state
should be permitted to deport him even if there is a real risk that he will be mistreated in his
home country. See Observations of the Governments of Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, and
the United Kingdom, Ramzy v. Netherlands, App. 4900/06 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://www.redress.org/publications/GovernmentintervenorsobservationsinRamzy%20case22
November.pdf; Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, European Court of Human Rights: Ban on
Torture is Absolute and Universal (July 11, 2007), available at http://news.amnesty.org/inde
x/ENGIOR300162007. In the Saadi case, however, the European Court of Human Rights
rejected that argument, concluding that the ECHR’s implicit prohibition against refoulement
is absolute. Saadi, supra ¶ 139. Separately, Canada acknowledges that in unspecified “exceptional circumstances” it may lawfully deport a terrorism suspect irrespective of the risk of
home-country mistreatment. See Suresh v. Canada, [2002] S.C.R. 3, 46.
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These measures demonstrate that states perceive an occasional but
serious need to evade the criminal process in order to contain the threat
from non-battlefield suspects. Thus, although many states have publicly
condemned U.S. detention practices, several have also participated in those
practices. Likewise, several states have sought to deport terrorism suspects
despite the risk of home-country mistreatment. Yet the fact that these measures were or are employed covertly (or under inaccurate pretenses) signals
that states consider them legally suspect and are generally unwilling to push
for a change in the law to permit them.138
C.

. . . And Through Administrative Detention

In addition to evading the criminal process discreetly, several states
have sought to contain the threat posed by non-battlefield suspects by experimenting with administrative detention. Most of these experiments have
been public and subject to legislative and judicial oversight. The broad use
of such detention indicates that, although states perceive an occasional need
to contain the threat posed by non-battlefield suspects without resort to the
criminal process, and although they sometimes are willing to satisfy that
need in legally suspect ways, they also appreciate the benefits to working
within a prescribed legal framework.

138

Indeed, most of the participation by other states in U.S. detention practices was denied
or investigated when it became public. Canada established a commission to review its role in
the detention and mistreatment of Maher Arar. See Commission of Inquiry into the Actions
of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, http://www.ararcommission.ca (last visited
Mar. 31, 2008). In Germany, arrest warrants were issued relating to the abduction of Khaled
el-Masri. See Mark Landler, German Court Confronts U.S. on Abduction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1, 2007, at A1; Craig Whitlock, Germans Charge 13 CIA Operatives, WASH. POST, Feb. 1,
2007, at A1. Italian prosecutors have indicted twenty-six Americans and five Italians in the
Abu Omar case. See Richard Owen, CIA Agents Must Be Charged over “Kidnap and Torture,” Says Judge, TIMES (London), Feb. 17, 2007, at 39. Sweden has initiated an internal
investigation into its deportation of an Egyptian imam to Egypt. See Craig Whitlock, A Secret Deportation of Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, July 25, 2004, at A1. And Spain and Portugal are each investigating whether CIA aircraft carrying detainees transited their airspace
or stopped for refueling in their territories. See Spain Probes “Secret CIA Flights,” BBC
NEWS, Nov. 15, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4439036.stm; Associated Press,
Report: Portugal Opens Criminal Investigation into Alleged CIA Flights, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Feb. 5, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/02/05/europe/EU-GEN-PortugalCIA-Flights.php. Notably, two European states (Germany and Italy) have obstructed judicial
investigations into non-battlefield detentions by invoking “state secrets” protections. See
COE Second Report, supra note 129, ¶ 5. For one exception, where a few states have pushed
for a change in the law, see the discussion supra note 137 regarding the Saadi case.
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Detention Predicated on Criminal or Immigration Proceedings

In most instances, western democracies predicate security-based
administrative detention on future criminal or immigration proceedings. By
predicating detention on those other proceedings, these states contain the
scope of application of the administrative detention regime and purport to
avoid the form of detention that is more suspect under international law.
This Subsection demonstrates, however, that security-based detention predicated on other proceedings may easily but informally convert into pure security-based detention, but without adequate controls.
With respect to future criminal proceedings, a number of states now
permit extended pre-charge detention in terrorism cases. Under legislation
passed in 2006, the U.K. government may detain terrorism suspects without
charge for up to twenty-eight days,139 in contrast to the four days permitted
for non-terrorism-related suspects.140 In Spain, the government may now
detain terrorism suspects without charge for up to thirteen days, as opposed
to the usual three.141 And in France, that period is now six days instead of
two.142 The purported purpose of extending the permissible period of precharge detention is to give the authorities more time to investigate terrorism-related offenses, which may be more difficult to investigate than other
crimes. Yet extended detention may be permitted without any rigorous
showing that it is necessary or justified in a particular case, and future criminal charges are not always forthcoming. States that extend the permissible
period of pre-charge detention in terrorism cases, and that ultimately release

139
Terrorism Act, 2006, c.11, § 23 (U.K.); Alan Cowell, Britain Arrests 9 Suspects in Terrorist Kidnapping Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at A3. U.K. security officials now consider
the twenty-eight-day period of pre-charge detention to be insufficient and have been advocating for extending it still further. See Alan Cowell, 7 Men Sentenced in Qaeda Bomb Plot in
the U.S. and Britain, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2007, at A3; Jane Perlez, British Leader Seeks
New Terrorism Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2007, at A12.
140
See JAGO RUSSELL, LIBERTY, TERRORISM PRE-CHARGE DETENTION COMPARATIVE LAW
STUDY 17 (2007) [hereinafter LIBERTY STUDY], available at http://www.liberty-humanrights.org.uk/issues/pdfs/pre-charge-detention-comparative-law-study.pdf.
141
There is some disagreement in the literature on whether the thirteen-day detention must
be predicated on future criminal charges or is pure security-based detention. In either event,
this period of detention is longer than was ordinarily permissible. See HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, SETTING AN EXAMPLE? COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES IN SPAIN 1-2, 24-26 (2005)
available at http://hrw.org/reports/ 2005/spain0105/spain0105.pdf; LIBERTY STUDY, supra
note 140, at 48; JACK STRAW, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, COUNTER-TERRORISM
LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE: A SURVEY OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 26 (2005).
142
Code de procédure pénale [C. Proc. Pén.] [Code of Criminal Procedure] [2007] arts. 63,
706-88; LIBERTY STUDY, supra note 140, at 38; Bennhold, supra note 135; AFX News,
French Parliament Adopts Tough Anti-Terrorism Law, FORBES.COM, Dec. 22, 2005,
http://www.forbes.com/ work/feeds/afx/2005/12/22/afx2410169.html.
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a large percentage of detainees without filing any charges, thus employ systems of short-term, pure security-based detention.143
France also predicates more long-term detentions on future criminal
proceedings. Under French law, terrorism suspects may be detained for up
to four years while they are criminally investigated and before any trial, so
long as they are charged with a terrorism-related offense.144 This technically
is not administrative detention because the suspect has actually been
charged with an offense. But terrorism offenses in France are often vaguely
defined, and charges may be based only on suspicion, with the understanding that the special magistrate judge assigned to the case will conduct most
of the investigation after the defendant is charged.145 This system thus
overtly permits long-term detention without any rigorous demonstration of
necessity or prior wrongdoing.146 Moreover, such detention frequently is, for
all intents and purposes, pure security-based detention. Many suspects have
been detained for years and then released without trial or conviction.147
With respect to future immigration proceedings, several western
democracies now detain terrorism suspects pending deportation.148 For instance, in Canada the government may detain a foreign national pending
deportation where there are “reasonable grounds to believe that [he poses] a

143
See U.K. Home Office Terrorism and the Law, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/
terrorism-and-the-law/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2008) (reporting that of the 1166 terrorism suspects arrested in the United Kingdom between September 11, 2001 and March 31, 2007, 669
were released without charge).
144
See Bennhold, supra note 135.
145
French law categorizes as a terrorism-related offense a wide variety of conduct committed with the purpose of seriously disrupting public order through intimidation. That category
includes the broad offense of “participation in any group . . . established with a view” to
committing acts of terrorism (evinced by at least one material act). Code pénal [C. Pén.]
[Penal Code] [2007] art. 421-2-1; see also id. art. 421-1 (setting forth most terrorism-related
offenses).
146
See Jeffrey Fleishman et al., Outraged Europeans Take Dimmer View of Diversity, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A4 (“Anti-terrorism magistrates [in France] have extensive powers
enabling them to jail suspects for up to four years pending trial on minimal evidence.”).
147
See Sandro Contenta, “Sheriff” Keeping Eye on Canada, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 10,
2002, at B3, available at LEXIS; Michael Dobbs, In France, Judge Fights Terrorism and
Critics, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2001, at A34; Craig Whitlock, French Push Limits in Fight on
Terrorism, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2004, at A1.
148
See, e.g., Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime
Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 89-91 (2005) (United States);
Austrian Minister Defends Jail-for-Refugees Initiative, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Nov. 2,
2004 (Austria); Roundup: Yemini Imam in German Jail May Face Long Legal Hearings,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 13, 2003 (Germany); infra notes 149-158 and accompanying text (Canada and United Kingdom); cf. Fleishman et al., supra note 146 (“From Rome to
Paris to Berlin, governments are rethinking the balance between civil rights and national
security, proposing tighter immigration and asylum laws . . . .”).
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danger to national security or to the safety of any person.”149 In its 2007
decision in Charkaoui v. Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court reviewed
Canada’s practice of detaining persons for several years “pending deportation,” based on that reasonable belief standard.150 The Court held that such
lengthy and indeterminate periods of detention are lawful, so long as the
judicial review afforded to detainees is made more meaningful, and specifically so long as detainees are given the information based on which detention was ordered or, if that information is classified, a substantial substitute
for it.151 The Court did not consider the legality of detentions “pending deportation” where deportation has become practically infeasible (for example, because of the risk of home-country mistreatment),152 even though Canada has engaged in such detentions.153 Thus, because the deportation of
terrorism suspects is frequently either protracted or infeasible, securitybased immigration detention in Canada may be only loosely tied to, or even
completely unhinged from, deportation proceedings. These detentions have
essentially converted into pure security-based detentions, permitted under a
low, reasonable belief standard.
Whereas the Charkaoui Court avoided the question of indefinite
immigration detention, the House of Lords of the United Kingdom was confronted with exactly that question in A. v. Home Secretary, a 2004 case
challenging post-9/11 legislation that permitted the government to detain
indefinitely any alien who was reasonably believed to pose a security threat
but who would not leave the United Kingdom voluntarily and could not be
returned to his home country because of a real risk of mistreatment.154 Because the legislation permitted detention in the absence of pending deportation proceedings, it explicitly permitted pure security-based detention, but
only of foreign nationals. In the government’s view, such detention was
preferable to the available alternatives: leaving the suspect uncontained in
the United Kingdom or returning him to his home country, where he faced

149

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 27, § 82 (Can.).
See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.R. 350.
151
Id. at 387-90. As originally drafted, the legislation required the government to afford a
detainee the opportunity for judicial review within forty-eight hours if he was a permanent
resident, or after 120 days if he was not. However, the Canadian Supreme Court found that
the 120-day “grace period,” during which a non-national, non-resident could be detained
without judicial review, was impermissibly long. Id. at 403.
152
Charkaoui, [2007] S.C.R. at 417.
153
See Kent Roach, Must We Trade Rights For Security? The Choice Between Smart,
Harsh, or Proportionate Security Strategies in Canada and Britain, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2151, 2194 (2006).
154
A. v. Home Secretary, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(U.K.).
150
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the real risk of extended detention plus mistreatment.155 The Law Lords
determined, however, that the indefinite detention of foreign nationals was
disproportionate to the exigencies of the situation.156 Since that decision, the
United Kingdom has continued to employ security-based immigration detention, but not on the understanding that immigration detainees may be
held indefinitely.157 The government sometimes avoids the perception of
indefinite detention by seeking or obtaining from the suspect’s home country diplomatic assurances that he will not be mistreated if deported.158
2.

Pure Security-Based Detention

In rarer instances, western democracies have candidly developed
systems of pure security-based detention. India and Israel—two states with
long histories of trying to combat transnational terrorism—consistently have
used such detention for that purpose.159 So too have more authoritarian

155
The international prohibition of refoulement made it unlawful for the United Kingdom to
return these suspects to their home countries, but, because indefinite security-based detention
is also presumably unlawful under the ECHR, and dubious under the ICCPR, the United
Kingdom derogated from the detention provisions of both instruments to accommodate its
new legislation. Shah, supra note 112, at 404-05.
156
A. v. Home Secretary, 2 A.C. 68. For a more thorough discussion of A. v. Home Secretary, see Shah, supra note 112, at 406; and Clive Walker, Clamping Down on Terrorism in
the United Kingdom, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1137 (2006).
157
See LORD ALEX CARLILE, FIRST REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEWER PURSUANT TO
SECTION 14(3) OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 2005, at 6-8 (2006) [hereinafter FIRST
CARLILE REPORT], available at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publicat
ion-search/prevention-terrorism-act-2005/laws-againstterror.pdf?view=Binary.
158
See id.; Matthew Hickley, Judges Let Two Libyan Terror Suspects Back on Our Streets,
DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Apr. 28, 2007, at 13 (“The Home Office has signed memoranda of understanding with Libya, Jordan and Lebanon and reached a similar deal with Algeria in the
hope of deporting foreign terror suspects to countries with questionable human rights records
where there is not enough evidence to prosecute them in Britain.”). U.K. courts have found
that deportation proceedings could not proceed, despite the diplomatic assurances obtained,
in at least two cases. See Joshua Rozenburg, Terror Suspects Cannot Be Deported to Libya,
Says Court, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Apr. 28, 2007, at 6 (“Two Libyans found to pose a
danger to national security are likely to be released on bail next week after a court ruled that
they could not be sent back to their own country.”).
159
See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text. For more current information on the
systems of administrative detention in India and Israel, see Christopher Gagné, Note, POTA:
Lessons Learned From India’s Anti-Terror Act, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 261 (2005); and
Joanne Mariner, Indefinite Detention of Terrorist Suspects, FINDLAW, June 10, 2002,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ mariner/20020610.html (Israel).
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states, like Singapore and Malaysia.160 This Subsection looks at the more
recent practice of the United Kingdom and the United States.161
The United Kingdom responded to the A. v. Home Secretary case
by passing new legislation in 2005 permitting it to impose on persons of any
nationality various liberty-restricting orders, including in serious cases pure
security-based detention.162 Liberty-restricting orders short of detention have
included restrictions on movement and prohibitions on access to specific
items or services.163 Detention is contemplated as an extreme measure taken
with judicial oversight and where the alternatives have been exhausted or
rejected as insufficient. Moreover, for anyone subject to detention or other
liberty-restricting orders, the government must consider the possibility of a
criminal prosecution.164 Pure security-based detention thus is permitted in
the United Kingdom only if necessary, in that the security threat cannot be
contained by less restrictive measures or by the criminal process. In prac160

See Human Rights Comm’n Letter, supra note 112 (Singapore); Atkins, supra note 112,
at 97 n.124 (Malaysia).
161
Australia also seems to permit pure security-based detention in the event that there are
“reasonable grounds to suspect” that a person is participating in or possesses something in
connection with an “imminent” attack. See Katherine Nesbitt, Preventative Detention of
Terrorist Suspects in Australia and the United States: A Comparative Constitutional Analysis
45-48 (Mar. 22, 2007) (unpublished manuscript available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=9757
92).
162
See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c.2 (U.K.); see also FIRST CARLILE REPORT,
supra note 157; LORD ALEX CARLILE, SECOND REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
REVIEWER PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(3) OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM
ACT 2005 (2007) [hereinafter SECOND CARLILE REPORT], available at
http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/ prevention-terrorism
-act-2005/Lord-Carlile-pta-report-2006.pdf?view=Binary.
163
See FIRST CARLILE REPORT, supra note 157, at 1.
164
Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005, c.2, §§ 8(2), 8(4) (U.K.). To date, criminal prosecutions of persons restricted under the 2005 legislation have been rare. See FIRST CARLILE
REPORT, supra note 157, at 18-19; SECOND CARLILE REPORT, supra note 162, at 24-26; LORD
CARLILE, THIRD REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEWER PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(3) OF THE
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT OF 2005, at 27-28 (2008) [hereinafter THIRD CARLILE
REPORT], available at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publicationsearch/general/report-control-orders2008?view=Binary. Law enforcement officials attribute
that failure to “there [not being] evidence available that could realistically be used for the
purposes of a terrorism prosecution.” SECOND CARLILE REPORT, supra note 162, at 25. Despite the unavailability of such evidence, however, the decision to impose liberty-restricting
measures has, in every case, been supported by the independent reviewer charged with overseeing implementation of the 2005 legislation. See THIRD CARLILE REPORT, supra at 13;
SECOND CARLILE REPORT, supra note 162, at 13; FIRST CARLILE REPORT, supra note 157, at
12. This suggests that the measures respond to a threat that the British government has not
been able to address through the ordinary criminal process. Notably, however, some libertyrestricting measures have also been ineffective in containing the threat; a few suspects subject to such measures have subsequently disappeared and thus can no longer be monitored.
See Philip Johnston, DNA Loophole Is Hindering Terror Police, Says Reid, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), June 8, 2007, at 12.
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tice, this system has been more constrained than the systems of detention
discussed above that are predicated on future criminal and immigration proceedings. As of February 2008, the United Kingdom had not detained anyone under the 2005 legislation.165
For its part, the United States now employs a system of pure security-based administrative detention at Guantánamo Bay. Even though the
United States continues to assert the authority to detain both battlefield and
non-battlefield terrorism suspects at Guantánamo Bay on the basis of the
law of armed conflict,166 ongoing litigation has compelled the United States
to better regulate that detention scheme so that it increasingly resembles a
system of pure security-based administrative detention. The litigation in the
United States has focused on whether Guantánamo detainees may challenge
the legalit y of their detentions in U.S. federal court. The availability of federal court review is, of course, not required under the law of armed conflict,
but the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to apply that law, in its pure form,
to Guantánamo detainees. In its 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush, the Court
determined that federal courts had (statutory) habeas jurisdiction to review
the legality of detentions at Guantánamo Bay,167 and it justified that determination in part by distinguishing the Guantánamo Bay detainees from detainees in more conventional armed conflicts.168
The Rasul Court did not answer whether its jurisdictional ruling applied to all non-battlefield detainees held outside the United States, or only
to those at Guantánamo Bay. It also did not identify the substantive law
under which the Guantánamo detentions should be reviewed. It thus did not
answer whether the law of armed conflict governs.169 Nevertheless, the

165

See THIRD CARLILE REPORT, supra note 164, at 19.
Brief for Respondent at 2, 7-8, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05184).
167
542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
168
Id. at 476.
169
The U.S. Supreme Court has issued three other detainee decisions, but none is clear on
whether, in the Court’s view, the law of armed conflict properly governs non-battlefield
detentions. Some of its jurisprudence suggests that it believes the law of armed conflict does
govern. For instance, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Court reviewed the
detention of a U.S. national captured on the Afghan battlefield. The Court determined that
the authority to detain that person was inherent in the congressional grant of authority to use
force “‘against those nations, organizations, or persons’” connected to the September 11
attacks. Id. at 510 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §
2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. I 2001))). That grant of authority is certainly expansive enough to also authorize the use of force in a global fight
against al Qaeda. If, as Hamdi asserts, the authority to detain is inherent in the grant of authority to use force, then one logical extension of Hamdi is to understand the Congress to
have authorized armed-conflict detentions of all Qaeda members, irrespective of whether
they are captured on a conventional battlefield. The Court seemed to endorse that under166
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Court did afford Guantánamo detainees a legal process without any basis in
that law.170
Rasul has since been legislatively reversed (twice),171 and the debate
in the United States continues on the extent to which the law of armed conflict governs non-battlefield detentions, and on the legal process due to detainees.172 After Rasul, the United States established administrative bodies—termed Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)—to determine
whether detention at Guantánamo Bay is in each case justified.173 Congresstanding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006), when it applied only Common Article 3 to detainees captured in the “conflict with al Qaeda.”
When addressing the specific issue of detention, however, the Court has indicated that
the law of armed conflict may not govern, or at least that it may not govern alone. In Hamdi,
the Court emphasized the narrowness of its holding and concluded that the citizen-detainee
must be given the opportunity to contest before a neutral decision-maker the factual basis for
detention. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. As in Rasul, the Court afforded the detainee more
process than is required under the law of armed conflict (but less than is afforded in a criminal trial). Moreover, the Hamdi Court questioned whether the law of armed conflict properly
governs detentions in situations where “the practical circumstances . . . are entirely unlike
those of the conflicts that informed [its] development.” Id. at 521. Recall that the Rasul Court
itself underscored that the Guantánamo detentions were unlike detentions in more conventional conflicts. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
The Court’s fourth detainee decision, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), presented the question of whether the government could detain a non-battlefield, U.S. citizendetainee captured in the United States. The Court, however, did not reach that question, and
instead dismissed the petition for having been filed in the wrong jurisdiction. Id. at 451. For a
comprehensive discussion of the Court’s detainee decisions, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. &
David J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror,
120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007).
170
For a more extensive discussion on the failure of the U.S. Supreme Court even to look
to the law of armed conflict for guidance, see W. Michael Reisman, Rasul v. Bush: A Failure
to Apply International Law, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 973 (2004).
171
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat.
2739, 2742 (to be codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. 801 (e)(1)); Military Commissions Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2241(e)(1)).
172
See infra notes 176-177 and accompanying text; Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 183
(4th Cir. 2007), petition for reh’g en banc granted, No. 06-7427 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2007)
(concluding that the law of armed conflict does not govern the detention of a (foreign national) non-battlefield terrorism suspect captured in the United States and distinguishing Hamdi
on the ground that, unlike in that case, the detainee at issue had no connection to a recognizable battlefield).
173
See Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y Def. to Sec’y Navy on Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. A separate process, the Administrative Review Boards,
has been established to determine whether, once detained, persons may be released. See
Order of Deputy Sec‘y Def., Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants in
the Control of the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba (May 11,
2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/d20040518gtmoreview.pdf.
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sional legislation subjects CSRT determinations to limited review by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.174 In a July 2007 decision in Bismullah v. Gates, a panel of that court found that, in order for its
review of the CSRT determinations to be meaningful, counsel for the detainees must have access to the information based on which their clients are
detained, including in most cases classified information.175 At the time of
this Article’s publication, the U.S. government has filed a petition for certiorari from the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Bismullah,176 and the U.S. Supreme
Court is separately considering whether, now that the statutory basis for
habeas jurisdiction has been overturned, federal courts have jurisdiction
under the U.S. Constitution to review the legality of Guantánamo detentions.177 However those cases are resolved, the legal process available to
Guantánamo detainees has become significantly more elaborate than any
process formally required under the law of armed conflict.
Nevertheless, that process continues to be flawed and fails to ensure
that detention in each case is necessary. Under the CSRTs, detention is
permitted if a suspect “was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces,
or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States
or its coalition partners.”178 Detention thus is permitted based on a suspect’s
potential affiliation and irrespective of whether detention is necessary to
contain the security threat. For instance, by the government’s own account,
detention would be permitted where a person unknowingly sent funds to a
Qaeda-linked organization or where she taught a Qaeda member’s son.179
Moreover, the finding that the suspect was part of or supporting a transnational jihadi group may be made based on a low, preponderance of evidence
standard with a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government’s evidence.180 In practice, this low standard has enabled the government to maintain detentions without any rigorous determination of necessity.181 Deten174

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e)(2)(A), 119 Stat. at 2742.
Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533
(“We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”).
176
Reply Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, Gates v. Bismullah, No. 07-1054 (U.S. Mar.
2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2007/2pet/7pet/2007-1054.pet.rep.html.
177
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3707
(U.S. June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195).
178
See Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y Def., supra note 173.
179
See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005).
180
See Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 181.
181
See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 134, at 15-20 (reporting on evidence used in
CSRTs and Administrative Review Boards). But cf. COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER, AN
ASSESSMENT OF 516 COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL (CSRT) UNCLASSIFIED
175
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tions have also continued long after detainees have been deemed eligible for
release—and thus presumably after the government determined that detention was not (or was no longer) necessary.182
V. DEVELOPING COHERENT STANDARDS
State practice thus illustrates that states reject detaining nonbattlefield terrorism suspects based on the law of armed conflict, but that
they perceive a real need to contain the threat from at least some suspects
outside the criminal process. States have employed a variety of extracriminal measures to satisfy that need. Some such measures were ad hoc
and intended to circumvent (rather than to work within or to try to change)
the law. But other measures—and specifically the measures of administrative detention—were taken deliberately and with legislative and judicial
participation. The use of these measures indicates that, although states have
been willing to evade the law, they are groping to operate within it—that is,
to develop alternative legal frameworks that satisfy their security needs.
An alternative legal framework already exists under human rights
law in the form of administrative detention. Yet in order for administrative
detention to fill the void for a sustainable detention regime in the fight
against terrorism, the law in this area must be further developed. Developing that law would serve two functions. It would inhibit states from exploiting the current legal ambiguity to detain persons in ways that are unnecessary or insufficiently protective of individual liberties. And it would enable
states—and particularly states that take seriously their human rights obligations, but also face a real threat from transnational jihadi terrorism—to detain terrorism suspects outside the criminal process but based on a legal
framework that establishes meaningful controls. It thus would curb the incentive to resort to ad hoc or uncontrolled measures.
This Part outlines four policy goals to inform the development of
law on security-based administrative detention as it applies in the fight
against terrorism. First, detainees must be afforded prompt legal process, in
which they have (at the very least) a meaningful opportunity to challenge,
before a neutral arbiter, the facts giving rise to detention and to offer evidence in rebuttal. Second, the standard of non-arbitrariness must be made
more robust. Extended security-based detention should be considered nonarbitrary only in narrowly defined circumstances: where the detainee himSUMMARIES (2007) (arguing that the Denbeaux and Denbeaux study has methodological
flaws).
182
See, e.g., 3 Detainees at Guantanamo Are Released to Albania, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,
2006, at A13; Josh White & Julie Tate, 4 Men Cleared of Terrorism Links but Still Detained,
WASH. POST, May 20, 2006, at A18; Craig Whitlock, 82 Inmates Cleared but Still Held at
Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2007, at A1 (reporting that about eighty-five Guantánamo detainees have been deemed eligible for release).
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self poses a serious security threat, where detention is necessary to contain
that threat, and where it is designed to last no longer than necessary. Third,
with that enhanced standard of non-arbitrariness, pure security-based detention should be permitted. And finally, any state that employs a system of
administrative detention must define the boundaries between it and the
criminal process.
A.

Prompt and Meaningful Legal Process

States must afford detainees prompt, fair, and meaningful legal
process on the lawfulness of detention. The comprehensive human rights
instruments all establish the requirement of judicial review,183 and oversight
bodies consistently underscore the importance of such review to check
against capricious or unjustified detention.184 Moreover, the absence or inadequacy of judicial review has been the primary concern expressed by various human rights bodies with respect to U.S. detention practices.185 Those
same concerns have animated the debate within the United States, and ultimately have compelled the U.S. government to make the legal process at
Guantánamo Bay more rigorous.186 The availability of meaningful legal
process is critical because, unlike traditional combatants, terrorists operate
by blending into the general population, and any counterterrorism detention
regime thus is likely to target a relatively high number of innocents—
persons who are suspected of posing a threat but in fact do not.
Legal process may be fair and meaningful even if detainees are not
afforded the full panoply of safeguards that a state ordinarily affords criminal defendants. Many such safeguards reflect a state’s own legal and normative traditions and are not required by international law. Indeed, domestic
criminal justice systems vary significantly across jurisdictions. Some states
employ a standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt, but others use
something closer to a preponderance of the evidence standard.187 Some categorically exclude certain forms of evidence (such as hearsay or evidence
obtained unlawfully), while others admit such evidence on the understand183

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Torture and Detention, ¶¶ 77-78,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6 (Dec. 1, 2005); General Comment No. 29, supra note 51, ¶ 16;
General Comment 8, supra note 72.
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See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 167-175 and accompanying text.
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See Thomas V. Mulrine, Reasonable Doubt: How in The World Is It Defined?, 12 AM.
U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 214-23 (1997) (comparing the standards of proof in criminal cases
across jurisdictions); Michele Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 51 AM. J. COMP. L.
659, 665-69 (2003) (asserting that many civil code countries do not employ a criminal standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt).
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ing that the adjudicator will take into account its potential unreliability.188
Given this variance, no one system can be said to embody the best or only
way to ensure criminal defendants fair legal process. Thus, the legal process
afforded to administrative detainees might reasonably deviate from a state’s
own rules of criminal procedure while still being fundamentally fair and
consistent with international law.
That said, it is extraordinarily difficult to identify with specificity
the minimum legal process that should be permitted under a system of administrative detention, and human rights law currently gives us little guidance. Broadly speaking, terrorism suspects must have the prompt and meaningful opportunity to challenge, before a neutral arbiter, the facts giving
rise to detention and to offer evidence in rebuttal. The promptness requirement means that detainees must have at least a preliminary opportunity to
contest their detentions within a matter of days, not months.189 This requirement renders a system of administrative detention potentially more
liberty-protecting than the criminal process because innocent terrorism suspects may demonstrate within days that they do not pose a threat and that
detention is therefore unwarranted—an option that may not exist to escape
extended pretrial detention under the criminal process.190
The requirement that judicial review be meaningful entails at least
three things. First, the reviewing body must have the authority to order the
detainee’s release if it determines that detention is unjustified.191 Without
188

ANDREW L.-T. CHOO, HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 34 (1996).
Indeed, international criminal tribunals themselves admit evidence that would be inadmissible under the common law tradition. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Decision on the Motion of Prosecution for Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 16 (Jan. 19, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion on Hearsay, ¶¶ 14, 19
(Aug. 5, 1996); Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence:
Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 745-53
(1999).
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See General Comment 8, supra note 72, ¶ 2 (asserting that delays in bringing a detainee
before a judge “must not exceed a few days”); see also NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE 40608 (2002).
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With respect to pretrial detention in the United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2000)
(permitting pretrial detention upon a judicial finding that “no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of
any other person and the community”). See also Kuckes, supra note 56, at 23 (“[R]outine
pretrial criminal hearings . . . are not designed to test the issue that is most fundamental from
a due process perspective—whether sufficient evidence of criminal wrongdoing exists to
justify depriving the defendant of liberty and property interests pending trial.”).
191
See ICCPR, supra note 51, art. 9(4) (providing for the court to decide on the lawfulness
of detention “and order [the detainee’s] release if the detention is not lawful”); see also
American Convention, supra note 51, art 7(6); ECHR, supra note 51, art. 5(4). The requirement that the reviewing body have the authority to order a detainee’s release if it determines
that detention is unjustified may present practical complications for the detaining state (for
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that authority, judicial review is vacuous. Second, the detainee must be
equipped to participate in that process and to pursue her rights within it.
This almost certainly requires legal counsel or some other form of independent representation.192 Finally, the detainee must be informed of the factual
basis for detention and be given a genuine opportunity to respond. The D.C.
Circuit in Bismullah and the Canadian Supreme Court in Charkaoui both
underscored this point: a detainee cannot reasonably challenge the justification for detention if it is not made available to her.193 States that rely on classified evidence to detain terrorism suspects thus must share either that evidence or a substantial substitute with the detainee (or with her representative). This is a compromise approach. States may not invoke the existence
of classified intelligence to obstruct a detainee’s opportunity for rebuttal,
but they may protect intelligence information, sources, or methods in ways
that may be impermissible under the criminal process. For instance, a state
may design a system of administrative detention that permits it to keep classified some of the intelligence on which it relies; to share intelligence only
with the detainee’s security-cleared representative, and not with the detainee
herself; or to present statements from an intelligence source without affording the detainee an opportunity to confront that source in person on the veracity of his statements.
B.

Non-Arbitrariness

Judicial review and the other procedural constraints on detention are
critical, but they are only as protective as the underlying substantive standards based on which detention is permitted. Thus, the procedural constraints are not sufficient on their own to prevent abuse. Part III demonstrated, however, that the current substantive constraints on administrative detention are insufficient in the security context. These constraints must be
adjusted with non-battlefield detentions in mind. Specifically, such detention should be lawful only where the detainee himself poses a serious security threat, where detention is necessary to contain that threat, and where
detention is calibrated to last no longer than necessary.
First, in order for security-based detention to be non-arbitrary, the
detainee himself must pose a serious security threat. This proposition is
supported by the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee on detenexample, if the detainee is not a national or resident of the detaining state, and return to his
home country would create a substantial risk of mistreatment). That requirement nevertheless
is essential for judicial review to be meaningful. States that engage in security-based detention thus should develop in advance plans for releasing detainees for whom detention is
deemed unjustified.
192
See supra note 76.
193
See supra notes 151, 175 and accompanying text.
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tions outside the security context, and by its conversation with Israel on the
detention of “bargaining chips.”194 Moreover, one of the criticisms voiced
against the CSRT process at Guantánamo Bay is that it permits detention for
anyone who has supported al Qaeda or associated forces without requiring
any individualized assessment of threat.195 Not everyone who supports al
Qaeda or other transnational jihadi groups poses the state targets of those
groups a sufficiently serious threat to warrant security-based detention. For
instance, a Pakistani villager who attends a Qaeda training camp may technically be a member of al Qaeda, but if he does nothing more, he poses
western governments no real security threat, and his detention by those governments would therefore be unjustifiable.196 Indeed, his detention would
probably be unjustifiable even if he had intelligence information that those
governments would consider useful. International law and practice do not
appear to condone administrative detention for the purpose of obtaining
intelligence where the detainee himself poses no security threat.197 And, in
any event, a system of detention designed primarily to obtain intelligence
would require a different balance between liberty and security than the balance achieved in a system designed to contain persons who themselves pose
a threat.
International law must, therefore, establish standards for identifying
when a non-battlefield terrorism suspect poses a sufficiently serious security
threat to render his detention non-arbitrary. For guidance, international lawyers might look to the treatment by the law of armed conflict of civilians
who participate in the fighting.198 Under the law of armed conflict, civilians
may not be the object of military attack, but they lose that immunity from
attack “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”199 There con194

See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text; see also James G. Stewart, Rethinking
Guantánamo: Unlawful Confinement as Applied in International Criminal Law, 4 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 12, 23-25 (2006).
196
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disturbances, is a sufficient basis for detention. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 34,
art. 4(A); COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 43, at 258.
197
See Pejic, supra note 52, at 380 (“[I]nternment or administrative detention for the sole
purpose of intelligence gathering, without the person involved otherwise presenting a real
threat to State security, cannot be justified.”).
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Cf. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653, 2655-58 (2005) (discussing the direct participation standard in the context of U.S. detentions based on the Congressional authorization to
use military force in response to the September 11 attacks).
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Additional Protocol I, supra note 34, art. 51(3) (applicable in international armed conflicts); Additional Protocol II, supra note 34, art. 13(3) (applicable in certain non195
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tinues to be some ambiguity as to what constitutes “direct participation” for
purposes of the loss of civilian immunity.200 But civilians generally are understood to lose their immunity when preparing for or returning from combat and when providing logistical support or target information for immediate use.201 By contrast, civilians maintain their immunity when involved
in the war effort without themselves posing any threat—for example when
working in a manufacturing plant that produces materiel for use in the
war.202 If the law on the loss of civilian immunity is adjusted for nonbattlefield detentions, persons who organize or direct attacks, or who are
preparing to commit an attack, might be candidates for detention by the
state-targets of those activities. By contrast, persons who provide only financial support to a terrorist organization, or who express a passing commitment to jihad (without doing anything more), might not. The reason for
the distinction is that the latter suspects—those who do not or who only
indirectly participate in attacks—do not themselves pose a security threat
warranting detention, although their activities may warrant criminal sanction203 or liberty-restricting measures short of detention.
The determination that someone poses a serious security threat is
not easily reviewed by international human rights bodies. As was demonstrated in Part III, neither the Human Rights Committee nor the European
Court of Human Rights seriously examines such determinations. These bodies are not equipped or authorized to make those determinations de novo,
but their review nevertheless may be made more probing. For example, in
Ahani and Chahal, the two bodies could have—and should have—examined
more carefully the domestic standards under which the detentions were authorized. The same is true of the Human Rights Committee’s review of the
systems for pure security-based detention in India and Israel, and at Guantánamo Bay. In this context, the reasonable belief standard may justify
short- but not long-term detention. A state looking to engage in extended
detention should be required to demonstrate more than simply a reasonable
belief or suspicion that the suspect poses a threat—a substantive standard

international armed conflicts); see also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 49, at
19-24 (applicable as a matter of customary international law).
200
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2115-16 n.306 (2005).
201
See BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 28, at 301-04; COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 618-19.
202
See BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 28, at 301-04; COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 618-19.
203
See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (requiring states to criminalize the financing of acts of terrorism); S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (same).
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akin to the one under the law of armed conflict and insufficiently protective
of the detainees’ liberty interests in the fight against terrorism.
Second, for security-based detention to be non-arbitrary, it must be
necessary to contain the threat or to meet the other government interests
being pursued. Detention presumably is unnecessary if those interests may
be satisfied by less restrictive alternatives. States therefore should be required to consider the availability of such alternatives before they engage in
administrative detention, and particularly in extended such detention. Where
detention serves more than one interest—for instance, where pre-charge
detention serves both a preventative interest in containing the threat and a
criminal justice interest in preventing flight or investigating the offense—
then it is reasonable for a state to consider both of those interests in assessing the availability of alternatives. But if those interests may be satisfied by
less restrictive alternatives, states should be required to employ them. Such
alternatives may include, for example, restrictions on movement or on
access to particular services, as under the 2005 British legislation.204
Finally, the standard of non-arbitrariness should be interpreted to
prohibit detentions from lasting any longer than necessary. The procedural
mechanism for this is periodic judicial review.205 As a substantive matter,
however, it may be extraordinarily difficult to identify the point at which
detention is no longer necessary, i.e., to determine whether a person who
has been detained for some time would again pose a threat if released. Nevertheless, the duration of detention must be contained.206 Detention enables
a state to disrupt ongoing terrorist activity and, if appropriate, to develop a
more considered criminal case. It may also remove a suspect from the
“game” by putting him and others on notice that he is of interest to the authorities and thus rendering him unattractive as a future operative.207 Over
time, those interests that justify detention become less paramount and give
way to the liberty interests against detention. The detaining state therefore
should be required to satisfy increasingly stringent evidentiary standards to
204
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hold a suspect beyond incrementally set periods. For instance, short-term
detention might be permitted on a reasonable belief standard, but to continue the detention in the medium- and long-term, the state would have to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing
evidence that detention continues to be warranted.208 Moreover, after a certain point (for example, two years), all or almost all detainees must be released, deported, or criminally prosecuted. To the extent that detention
beyond that point is ever justifiable, it is justifiable only in truly exceptional
cases—for instance, where a state has demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence that a suspect would pose a particularly serious security threat if
released.
C.

Form of Administrative Detention

With that enhanced standard of non-arbitrariness in place, pure security-based detention should be permitted.209 States gravitate toward predicating detention on criminal or immigration proceedings because those
forms of detention satisfy a variety of interests (i.e., punishment or deportation, in addition to containing the security threat) and are relatively well
208

For purposes of comparison, the (indefinite) civil commitment of persons who are mentally ill is constitutionally permitted in the United States so long as both mental illness and
dangerousness are established by at least clear and convincing evidence. See Addington v.
Texas, 441U.S. 418 (1979); see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (upholding
indefinite civil commitment of a mentally ill person where it was established beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed a criminal act and by a preponderance of the evidence that
he had a mental illness).
209
For instance, detention is already permitted in the United States to protect the public
from other hazards, including the spread of infectious diseases and dangerous acts committed
by the mentally ill or by sex offenders. For a review of such non-criminal, preventative detention in the United States, see Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a
Time: A Noncriminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 183-88 (2005). The purpose of such detention, like
that of security-based administrative detention, is not to punish for past acts, but to protect
the public from some prospective danger (and sometimes also to rehabilitate the detainee).
Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that the preventative detention of terrorism
suspects may sometimes be lawful. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Court
construed a statute on immigration detention not to permit indefinite detention because it was
not sufficiently narrowly tailored. The Court explained that “[t]he provision authorizing
detention does not apply narrowly to ‘a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals,’
say, suspected terrorists, but broadly to aliens ordered removed for many and various reasons . . . .” Id. at 691 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). This language suggests
that indefinite immigration detention might be lawful in the United States if it is narrowly
tailored, for example, to apply only to certain terrorism suspects. More recently, during the
oral argument in Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Breyer suggested that Congress might have the
authority to design a narrowly tailored system of preventative detention to contain terrorism
suspects outside the immigration context. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, 47, 54,
Boumediene v. Bush, (2007) No. 06-1195.
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accepted in international law and practice. Yet detention predicated on future criminal or immigration proceedings may convert informally into pure
security-based detention, without adequate controls.210 Moreover, such detention may fail to satisfy the security and liberty interests at stake in the
fight against terrorism.
For instance, security-based immigration detention responds only to
a fraction of the state’s security needs because it permits detention only of
foreign nationals and only until the date of deportation. It therefore does not
address the threat posed by a state’s own nationals or by foreign nationals
outside its jurisdiction, even though the security threat from both groups
may be considerable.211 Such detention may also fail to protect the relevant
liberty interests. Detention pending deportation is generally designed as a
short-term measure, so the standard for detention is often quite low.212 In
the counterterrorism context, however, deportation proceedings may become protracted or infeasible because of the risk of home-country mistreatment. States that hinge security-based detention on deportation proceedings
thus may engage in extended detention without any rigorous demonstration
of necessity. If states were instead permitted to develop systems of pure
security-based detention, they could make detention decisions on the basis
of the severity of the threat (and not only on the nationality of the suspect),
but such decisions would be subject to controls that are unnecessary where
the goal of deportation is immediately realizable. In other words, pure security-based detention would enable states to better satisfy the liberty and security interests at stake in this context.
D.

Relationship to the Criminal Law

Finally, states that employ security-based administrative detention
must define the boundaries between it and the criminal process so that legal
standards govern who is processed through which system and when.213 International law and practice currently provide almost no guidance on this
210
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issue, and the questions posed are not easily answered. One question is
whether administrative detention should be a last resort that is available
only when the criminal law is not, or whether the availability of the criminal
law should be irrelevant. The United Kingdom’s 2005 legislation leans toward the former approach. Because the government must consider filing
criminal charges against anyone subject to pure security-based detention,
extended detention is permitted in the United Kingdom only when the criminal process is deemed unavailable.214 A second question relates to the procedures for prosecuting persons who have previously been detained administratively. Should these persons be tried under the state’s ordinary rules of
criminal procedure, or should states develop different rules to facilitate terrorism-related prosecutions? For instance, where an administrative detainee
is interrogated without the procedural safeguards afforded to criminal defendants, should the information obtained be admissible in a subsequent
criminal trial, even if it would not be admissible in the trial of a more ordinary criminal defendant? Section II.C argued that states that deviate in the
counterterrorism context from their ordinary rules of criminal law or procedure risk contaminating their criminal justice systems more generally. Yet a
number of states have already developed special rules of criminal procedure
applicable in terrorism cases.215
VI. CONCLUSION
International practice demonstrates that, although most states have
declined to detain non-battlefield terrorism suspects based on the law of
armed conflict, many are looking for options for incapacitating these suspects outside the criminal process. The bipolar paradigm for thinking about
non-battlefield detentions—as armed-conflict or criminal—is out of step
with that practice and is mistaken as a matter of law. Human rights law
permits administrative detention for reasons of national security, subject to
important constraints. Those constraints are not now sufficient in the counterterrorism context. But if the law in this area is developed, administrative
detention may strike the most appropriate balance between liberty and security for certain categories of terrorism detainees.
This Article articulates four broad policy goals for developing the
law on security-based administrative detention in the fight against terrorism.
First, detainees must be afforded prompt and meaningful legal process.
214
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Second, extended administrative detention is permissible only in specified
circumstances—i.e., where the detainee himself poses a serious security
threat, where detention is necessary to contain that threat, and where detention lasts no longer than necessary. Third, in those circumstances, securitybased detention need not be tied to other legal proceedings, such as future
criminal trial or deportation. And finally, any state that employs a system of
administrative detention must carefully define the boundaries between it and
the ordinary criminal process.
In articulating these policy goals, this Article does not purport to offer a comprehensive legislative scheme. Much still must be done to refine
the international legal rules and to implement them domestically. This Article does, however, argue for shifting the debate to those questions and
away from the stale armed-conflict-or-criminal divide. This shift is imperative. Transnational jihadi terrorism is here to stay, and it will increasingly be
fought away from any conventional battlefield. In the absence of any legal
template for dealing with non-battlefield suspects, states must choose between exposing themselves to devastating attacks and pursuing uncontrolled
or ill-suited measures to contain the threat. Neither path is sustainable.

